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Wolfram: Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-of-State Lawyers

EXPANDING STATE JURISDICTION TO

REGULATE OUT-OF-STATE LAWYERS
Charles W. Wolfram*

I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers, like other members of the human species, are creatures of
habit. When thinking about which lawyers are subject to professional
discipline, lawyers have long been habituated to think of two sets of
practitioners. That orthodox view is that the first set consists of those
lawyers subject to regulation, and it includes all lawyers admitted to
practice in a particular jurisdiction. Those lawyers are subject to
professional discipline in their state (or states) of admission, but
nowhere else.' For example, in Wisconsin, bar disciplinary officials
regulate only those lawyers, of all the lawyers in the United States, who
have been admitted to practice in Wisconsin.2 Through that "hook" of
local admission leading to plenary disciplinary power, the bar can
threaten the professional status of all locally-admitted practitioners as
"members of the [local] bar" through some greater (disbarment) or lesser
(suspension, reprimand, etc.) professional discipline. The second setthose lawyers not subject to discipline, according to orthodoxy-consists
of all lawyers not admitted locally. Thus, in Wisconsin and most other
states,3 the bar disciplinary system is thought not to have any power to
regulate lawyers not admitted there.
Through a kind of wooden path dependency, that tradition of rigid
separation between admitted and nonadmitted lawyers obtains in most
states no matter how offensive the activities of nonadmitted lawyers
might have been, or in what other respects interests of the nonadmitting

*
1.
2.
3.
asserted,

Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor Emeritus, Cornell Law School.
See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, 490 A.2d 1224, 1227 (Md. 1985).
See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
For the small minority of jurisdictions in which, to date, a more extensive jurisdiction is
see infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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state might be strongly implicated. If, for example, a nonadmitted
lawyer's activities in the state caused injury to in-state clients, there is
nothing by way of discipline that bar disciplinary authorities in the state
can or will do. That result also obtains no matter that the activity
occurred entirely, or in some significant part, within the nonadmitting
state or for some other reason would be of great local interest if the same
injury had been caused by a locally admitted lawyer. That state of affairs
has been the more or less unquestioned arrangement since lawyer
regulation became a serious matter in the lives of lawyers earlier in the
last century.
The concept that a jurisdiction may affect the professional status of
any lawyer admitted there has proved to be largely unexceptionable. But
its negative flipside-holding that nonadmitted lawyers are entirely
beyond local disciplinary authority-is another matter. That part of the
traditional arrangement makes little sense and entails self-inflicted
limitations that threaten seriously to undermine an important-and
localizable-objective of lawyer regulation. It also creates significant
disparities in the reach of local regulation over admitted and
nonadmitted lawyers, and is unnecessary under either the Federal
Constitution or any generally applicable notion of state law. I argue here
that the basis for lawyer regulation should shift from the negativelylimited "hook" of local admission to a more soundly-reasoned and
realistically-based theory of expanded, but nonetheless still limited,
disciplinary power. The constitutional power of a state to regulate
commercial and professional activities more broadly-quite beyond
what the local admission basis allows-is so well supportable as to be
beyond serious challenge.4 Indeed, the defects in the local admission rule
have now become sufficiently clear that important groups in the
American Bar Association ("ABA") have called for its replacement with
a more soundly-grounded approach.5 This Article supports those efforts,
with some tweaking. Those groups include the so-called ABA Ethics
2000 Commission, which is currently engaged in substantially
reworking the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,6 the drafters
4. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
6. See generally COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, ABA,
REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2001) [hereinafter REPORT WITH

RECOMMENDATION], available at http://www.abanet.org/cprle2k-whole rpt.doe (last visited Mar.
22, 2002). At the August 2001 meeting of the ABA House of Delegates, action was taken on the
Commission's proposed amendments to the rules through Rule 1.10. The remaining amendments,
except for those to Rules 5.5 and 8.5, were considered at the early-February 2002 mid-year meeting.
See Ethics 2000-February2002 Report, at http:lwww.abanet.orglcpre/e2k-202report-summ.html
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of the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement,7 and
several state supreme courts. 8
Rejection of the traditional limitation of the local admission rule
over nonadmitted lawyers does not, however, mean that a state's power
to regulate lawyers should be embraced in disregard of state lines and
consequent limits on state power under the federal and state
constitutions. Obviously, real limits exist under the Federal Constitution,
constraining the extent to which a state may regulate extraterritorially
(but hardly forbidding all such regulation). 9 Moreover, and regardless of
(but certainly contemplating) constitutional limits, there are sound
reasons of local and interstate policy why a state should forebear from
attempting to exercise all possible constitutional power to regulate outof-state lawyers. An extravagant reach of such power would both impose
unwanted and unnecessary costs on the local regulatory apparatus and
could seriously impair legitimate and important interstate lawyering
activities of out-of-state lawyers.
In the discussion that follows, I first review the traditional local
admission basis for lawyer regulation, noting other remedies available in
the local state that might be thought to be suitable alternatives to
discipline, the anomalies that application of the local admission rule has
produced, and the largely historical accidents that first produced the
local admission rule but which are now irrelevant.'0 I then assess how the
local admission basis for discipline has led to unfortunate
consequences." Third, and finally, I suggest a framework within which a
properly modulated system of state regulation of nonadmitted lawyers
might operate. 2 To a large extent, this is congruent with existing
proposals for alternative approaches, but with possible differences in two
directions. First, I support language making it clear that all lawyering
activities (of a described kind) are covered, and second, I propose to
limit explicitly what might otherwise become occasional abuses of such
jurisdiction. What is needed is a practical and restrained notion under

Oast visited Mar. 20, 2002). For consideration of the pertinent Ethics 2000 Commission
recommendations, see infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCFMENT R. 6 (2001)
[hereinafter MODEL DISCIPLINARY RuLEs].
8. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, The Laiv of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to
Travel, and ExtraterritorialRegulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451, 487519 (1992).
10. See infra notes 34-61, 106-69 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 170-97 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 17
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1015

which some, but not all, activities of out-of-state lawyers with in-state
impacts are locally regulated. A concluding part of this Article offers
such a defining concept of "significant in-state activity" by lawyers who
are not locally admitted to practice.' 3 Such an exercise of power would
be within applicable constitutional limitations, would extend regulatory
jurisdiction only to the extent appropriate to vindicate strong and
legitimate state interests while avoiding interfering with legitimate
interstate law practice, and would provide a practical tool by which instate lawyer regulators could better police the profession.

II. THE CENTERING OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE ON LOCAL ADMISSION
At the outset, it would be well to illustrate further how the
traditional regulatory touchstone of in-state admission has worked in
practice. The operation of the rule is both simple and long-established.
Take as an example of this rule a recent West Virginia case, which also
provides an interesting glimpse at the earlier career of a lawyer who has
since gone on to fame as a national television figure. As will be seen,
while the facts are illustrative of the traditional approach, the court took
an uncompromisingly modem approach to the question of its jurisdiction
to discipline. According to the state supreme court's findings in Lawyer
DisciplinaryBoard v. Allen, 14 out-of-state lawyers from the District of
Columbia"s law firm of Allen, Coale & Van Susteren had engaged in
blatant in-state, in-person solicitation of clients over a period of three
years in violation of West Virginia laws prohibiting such activities. 6 The
D.C. lawyers, perhaps emboldened by the fact that their "home"
jurisdiction (among only a small handful of jurisdictions in the nation)
allows truthful and noncoercive in-person solicitation everywhere except
on the local courthouse steps and sidewalks, 17 had, according to the West
Virginia court, made direct telephone contact (either personally or
13. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
14. 479 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1996).
15. On the irony involved in the lawyers' state of local admission, see infra note 26 and
accompanying text.
16. See Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 323. Some of the solicitations were through agents sent
personally into the state, while other instances consisted of phone calls from outside West Virginia
to prospective clients in the state. See id. at 324.
17. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 7.1(d) (2000) (stating prohibition against
courthouse-steps solicitation); see also id R. 7.1(b)(1)-(5) (limiting in-person solicitation to
statements that are not false or misleading, that do not involve the use of undue influence, that do
not involve a person in a physical or mental condition such that they cannot exercise considered
judgment about selecting a lawyer, and, if it involves an intermediary, complies with other detailed
requirements).
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through nonlawyer intermediaries) with potential clients in West
Virginia, seeking to sign them up as clients-perhaps with the idea of
filing suits in the District of Columbia or elsewhere outside of the state."
Because the soliciting lawyers were not admitted to practice in West
Virginia, the traditional approach, which this Article criticizes, would
have forced the court to conclude that it had no regulatory power over
them.'9 It is of interest that the court's concept of jurisdictional power
apparently was limited to the power to discipline (as distinguished from
the power to adjudicate), as the court went to some length to establish
that the facts supported a finding of several disciplinary violations. °
Nonetheless, the West Virginia court in Allen announced prospectively
that in the future its bar disciplinary agency would exercise sanctioning
jurisdiction over any and all out-of-state lawyers who might "engage in
the practice of law" in the state-with no limitation to practicing

18. See Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 329. The safest disciplinary course for the soliciting lawyers
would have been to file suit on behalf of their clients outside West Virginia. Filing suit in a court in
West Virginia would have required that the D.C. lawyers enter their appearance there which, in turn,
would require that they either show that they were locally admitted for all purposes or move to be
admitted pro hac vice. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 3(2) & cmt. g (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS] (noting both general-admission and
special-admission bases for appearance of lawyer in litigation); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 15.4.3 (1986) [hereinafter WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETiNCs] (discussing
admission pro hac vice). The former course (obtaining local admission as a fully-credentialed
lavyer for all purposes) would, of course, subject the lawyers to West Virginia regulation under the
local-admission rule for all purposes. The latter course (obtaining only pro hac vice admission)
would subject them to regulation to the much more limited extent of threatening their ability to
proceed in that particular case if complaints were made that they had violated a local antisolicitation
rule. On the typically limited disciplinary power of a court over a lawyer admitted to practice pro
hac vice, see infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
19. In fact, the West Virginia court had already moved partly in the direction this Article will
urge. Its standards as promulgated at the time of the lawyers' alleged solicitation covered both
lawyers locally admitted as well as lawyers who, although admitted elsewhere, "'regularly engaged
in the practice of law"' in West Virginia. Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 335 (quoting Article VI, § 4 of the
West Virginia State Bar By-Laws). A key issue for the court was whether the lawyer's cumulative
activities constituted such "regular" practice. Although finding it a close question, the court
concluded that the lawyers' activities did not rise to that level. See id. at 336. Thus, the court's
implicit holding is that the bar lacked jurisdiction to sanction, although it did have jurisdiction to
conduct a hearing and announce a declaratory decision on the questioned conduct. See id. at 332,
336 (accepting lawyers' characterization of issue as limited to whether lawyer disciplinary board
had "jurisdiction to impose disciplinary sanctions"). Elsewhere, however, the court refers to whether
"the conduct in which respondents engaged is... subject to our disciplinary procedures." Id. at 336.
But see Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, 490 A.2d 1224, 1227 (Md. 1985) (indicating that
because a lawyer was not locally admitted or otherwise subject to discipline in-state, the court could
not pass on merits of disciplinary charges, even at the urging of the lawyer respondent, which was
rejected by the court, and the court stated that "subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
consent of the parties").
20. See Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 336,339.
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regularly or to any other extent.2 That future approach would be quite
dramatically at odds with traditional doctrine. Although I applaud the
court's creativity and its rejection of the wooden rule of local admission,
the court seems to indicate only a vaguely intuited set of limitations on
its notion of extraterritorial power to discipline. On further reflection,
one would hope that if I read the West Virginia court's intimations
correctly-it and all states would adopt a somewhat more limited
approach.22
Because it will be deployed as an illustrative disciplinary offense
below,23 it would be well to pause over the particular offense charged in
Allen, in-person2 solicitation for pecuniary gain (fees). Such activities
are prohibited throughout the United States,2 with the sole exception of
the District of Columbia,2 and, to a less-open extent, two or three other
states.27 A few scholars have criticized the prohibition,2 as has the
21. Id. at 336 & n.29 (broadly stating that "a lawyer is subject to discipline in this State ...
whether or not he or she is formally admitted to practice by this Court" and citing W. VA. R.
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1 (Michie 1994) (requiring only that a lawyer "engagel in the
practice of law in West Virginia" to be subject to discipline)).
22. See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
24. After Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), it is now conventional to
distinguish face-to-face (face-to-face, telephonic, or similar instant-response) communication from
indirect (if nonetheless targeted) communication, as through the mail or through a non-chat room email connection. Direct mail is considered entitled to commercial speech constitutional protection
under In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), which held that commercial speech protection applies to a
lawyer's mailing of professional cards to prospective clients, see id. at 206-07, and Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), which held that the mailing of a letter
suggesting legal services to persons known to be in need of such services was constitutionally
protected, see id. at 637. Allowing direct mail advertising is consistent with the prohibition against
in-person solicitation both because it is markedly less intrusive or subject to overbearing practices
and because it provides inherent proof of its content. See Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 326; see also Texans
Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar, 888 F. Supp. 1328, 1354 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (indicating that it
is permissible to regulate telephone solicitation because medium involves the same risks as inperson solicitation, with additional difficulty that recipient might not be able to identify caller), affid
mem., 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996).
25. See generally 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 57.3 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that modem lawyer codes "strictly proscribe" in-person
solicitation for pecuniary gain); WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 14.2.5, at
785-87 (generally describing scope of antisolicitation position of lawyer codes). For exceptions, see
infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
26. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 14.2.5, at 786.
27. See generally Solicitation-General,Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at
81:2001-05 (Apr. 22, 1992) (describing the near-universal acceptance of prohibition against inperson solicitation for pecuniary gain, but also showing slight deviations from that general
proposition).
28. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 250-65 (1990)
(arguing for broad acceptance of solicitation in interests of free expression and as method of
informing wronged persons of their legal rights, although noting near-universal rejection of such
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national organization of claimants' counsel, 9 but it has been upheld as
constitutional by a unanimous United States Supreme Court. It seems
highly unlikely that other states will be tempted to lessen the typical
view with which solicitation is prosecuted almost everywhere when

proof of the offense is available. As will be seen, given the strong policy
grounds for prohibiting lawyers from in-person solicitation for pecuniary

gain, presumably bar authorities in the great majority of states that
prohibit it would be highly motivated to consider favorably an approach
to disciplinary jurisdiction that would cover instances of in-state
solicitation by nonadmitted lawyers or their agents.3

arguments); Drake D. Hill, Deconstructingthe ProphylacticBan on Lawyer Solicitation, 62 TEMP.
L. REV. 875, 896, 899-900 (1989) (arguing for truth-in-soliciting rule instead of outright ban);
Kristina N. Bailey, Note, "Rainmaking" and D.C. Rule of ProfessionalConduct ZI: The In-Person
Solicitation of Clients, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL EThiCS 1335, 1351-54 (1996) (providing a similar
argument).
29. See THE RosCOE PoUND-AM. TRAL LAWYERS FOUND., THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S
CODE OF CONDUcr 701-704 (Public Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter ATLA CODE]. Among
other startling propositions, the ATLA Code would have permitted solicitation of a fifteen-year old
female accident victim in a hospital room, so long as the hospital had not adopted an explicit
regulation prohibiting the activity. See id. at 703 (illustrative case 7(d)). While styled a "public
discussion draft," the ATLA draft was never officially adopted by that organization. It seems to
have served only as a possible challenge to the ABA's own Model Rules of Professional Conduct
that were then being circulated for comment. See generally WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS,
supra note 18, § 2.6, at 62 (stating ATLA's self-described efforts for its draft to serve as
counterproposal to the ABA's Model Rules). The ATLA document was drafted by Professor
Monroe Freedman. See ATLA CODE, supra, at ii.
Not all groups of claimants' counsel agree with Professor Freedman. In 1993-94, the
Texas Trial Lawyers Association successfully lobbied the state legislature to increase the criminal
penalty for in-person or telephone solicitation to a felony in order to encourage more vigorous
prosecution. See, e.g., Milo Geyelin, Texas Lawyers Seek Bill to Curb Their Soliciting,WALL ST. J.,
May 25, 1993, at BI (providing a news account of lobbying effort of Texas Trial Lawyers
Association). The lobbying succeeded. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(a), (b), (f) (Vernon
Supp. 2002) (making such solicitation a felony).
30. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,449 (1978) (holding that states could,
consistent with lawyers' limited constitutional right to free expression, prohibit solicitation of
clients for pecuniary gain). A general exception exists for "non-pecuniary" solicitation, as when a
lawyer for an advocacy organization seeks a client willing to serve as the named party in test
litigation or the like. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422, 439 (1978) (holding that commercial
speech doctrine of First Amendment, limiting what would otherwise be constitutional free
expression protection, is inapplicable to such solicitation). Another limited exception is for inperson solicitation, even if for pecuniary gain (fees), when carried out in connection with recruiting
claimants for a federal court class action. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101-03 (1981)
(stating that the trial court injunction against contact with potential class members was an abuse of
discretion as inconsistent with class action rules of federal procedure, unless a court makes a
substantial evidence-based determination of particular need).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 191-97.
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Ill. LOCAL REMEDIES OTHER THAN PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
Other remedies than that of professional discipline are theoretically
available against an out-of-state lawyer who commits a disciplinary
offense in the local state, but each has serious limitations. On the facts
alleged3 2 in the Allen opinion, West Virginia's bar regulators might have
held out the hope for admission-state discipline-here, the hope that the
District of Columbia bar-regulatory body would prosecute its "own,"
thus vindicating West Virginia's antisolicitation policy. But, as will be
discussed, that is typically (and here) an unlikely, although possible,
eventuality.33
A possible alternative approach would be for West Virginia bar
disciplinary officials to resort to local tribunals seeking nondisciplinary
remedies. The most likely such approach is a local suit for injunctive
relief against the offending out-of-state lawyers, seeking to enjoin
repetition of such impermissible in-state activities. Such lawsuits are not
unknown, 34 and their possible implications are serious for the offending
lawyer. 35 Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state lawyer would be
32. On other facts, of course, additional remedies would be available. Of great importance,
most states take the position that the remedy of fee forfeiture (including the denial of fees not yet
paid) is available, for example with respect to a lawyer admitted in another state who commits
unauthorized practice within the state. See, e.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v.
Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1998) (holding that a New York lawyer who performed legal
services in California at the request of clients who controlled a California corporation engaged in
unauthorized practice and could not recover fees for work there); Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668
So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Massachusetts lawyer who resided but was not admitted in
Florida committed unauthorized practice by entering into contingent fee contract with Florida client,
making contract void). The nonadmitted lawyer is also subject to suit in the state through exercise of
the state's long-arm jurisdiction. See infra notes 36, 169 and accompanying text. Thus, the usual
panoply of remedies available to a client against a lawyer are available, and probably at a forum
convenient for the client, against the out-of-state lawyer.
33. See infra notes 62-103 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Bodhaine, 738 P.2d 376, 377 (Colo.
1987) (en bane) (granting a prohibitory injunction against lawyer admitted in California from instate (Colorado) unauthorized practice of law); Fla. Bar v. Lister, 662 So. 2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. 1995)
(per curiam) (enjoining Wisconsin lawyer living in Florida from providing legal services and
holding self out to practice law in Florida); Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n, 561 A.2d 200, 202, 211-23 (Md.
1989) (affirming, but modifying injunction against D.C.-admitted lawyer (not admitted in
Maryland) who publicly held himself out as lawyer engaged in general practice of law in Maryland
from principal office there); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Moore, 722 N.E.2d 514, 514, 515 (Ohio 2000)
(per curiam) (enjoining Pennsylvania-admitted lawyer conducting personal injury practice from
further practice in his office in Ohio); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Misch, 695 N.E.2d 244, 245, 248
(Ohio 1998) (per curiam) (enjoining Illinois lawyer from functioning as "independent contractor" of
Ohio law firm). Lawyer Kennedy, disciplined in Maryland, see Kennedy, 561 A.2d at 213, was
subsequently disciplined as well in the District of Columbia, see infra note 116.
35. On the possible collateral consequences of local bar discipline, see infra Part IV.A.
Similarly, injunctive relief may possibly provide a basis for discipline in the lawyer's home state.
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obtainable through resort to West Virginia's "long-arm" statute,36 which
subjects to in-state lawsuits any person who causes certain in-state
effects, even if from a place outside the state. But such lawsuits are
relatively more expensive and cumbersome, as compared to lawyer
discipline. Moreover, the contempt remedy is generally of no value to
remedy wrongs already committed, and indeed it might not be available
under the doctrine limiting the remedy to ongoing conduct or at least to
past conduct when there is -shown to be a substantial threat of its
repetition. 37 Moreover, while the trial judge would presumably be
somewhat familiar with West Virginia's lawyer code and its

requirements (for example, through presiding in litigated cases involving
legal malpractice or lawyer disqualification), her familiarity would pale
beside that of the bar disciplinary tribunals that adjudicate complaints
brought within the system of professional discipline.
Another possibility would have been criminal prosecution in a
West Virginia court, if the jurisdiction's criminal statutes contained an
appropriately worded antisolicitation law. 38 But, even if such a statute
However, the burden necessary to obtain injunctive relief in common use among the states is the
preponderance standard, while bar discipline typically requires a more exacting standard of proof,
such as the commonly employed "clear and convincing" standard. See generally RESTATEMENT,
LAWYERS, supra note 18, § 5 (stating that standard of proof in lawyer disciplinary proceedings "in
most jurisdictions is clear and convincing evidence, that is, evidence establishing the truth of the
charged offense beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence but not necessarily beyond a
reasonable doubt").
36. See, e.g., Clark v. Milam, 847 F. Supp. 409, 414 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (applying West
Virginia's interpretation of state's long-arm statute, suggesting that lawyer who transacts any
business in state is subject to substituted service on claim based on such contact). See generally
KEVmN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRtTORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 69-72 (1999).
West Virginia, along with all other states, has a long-arm statute. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-33
(Michie Supp. 2001). As is typical, its courts interpret the statute to apply to all instances in which it
would not offend due process to do so. See, e.g., Lozinski v. Lozinski, 408 S.E.2d 310, 311, 313
(V. Va. 1991) (holding that West Virginia could exercise personal jurisdiction under its long-arm
statute over person who committed a tort by failing to support his children in the state). Long-arm
statutes are chiefly useful to obtain specific jurisdiction, that is power over an out-of-state individual
for litigation directly relating to his or her in-state activities. See, e.g., Parsons v. Mains, 580 A.2d
1329, 1329, 1330 (D.C. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that Virginia lawyer who was counsel of record
in two or three actions in D.C. over a ten-year period was not subject to jurisdiction in D.C. for
alleged breach of contract and conversion not related to local activities).
37. See, e.g., I DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.9, at 225 (2d ed. 1993)
(discussing need to show threat of repetition for preventive injunction).
38. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6126(a) (West 1990) ("Any person advertising or
holding himself or herself out as practicing or entitled to practice law or otherwise practicing law
who is not an active member of the State Bar, is guilty of a misdemeanor."); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6512 (McKinney 2001) (stating a similar provision, but making the offense a "class E felony");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-310 (Law. Co-op. 2001) (stating that violation of a statute providing that
"[n]o person may practice or solicit the cause of another person in a court of this State unless he has
been admitted and sworn as an attomey" is a felony); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.48.180 (West
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were on the books, for West Virginia to prosecute District of Columbia
lawyers would require obtaining a local indictment or information,
successfully completing an extradition proceeding in the District, and
complying with the panoply of criminal-procedural rules applicable to
criminal suspects on the lam.39 Not surprisingly, recorded instances of
such criminal prosecutions against out-of-state lawyers are rare,
although not unknown. ' ° Although there is no constitutional requirement
that an extradition request charge a felony,1 that is the usual, although
not invariable, practice. 2 Criminal prosecution of a lawyer could be an
expensive, time-consuming process for a prosecutor. If the only
available sanctions are those made available for a misdemeanor offense,
prosecution is simply unlikely.43
Yet another theoretical possibility exists: discipline based on a
nonlocal lawyer's pro hac vice admission. The possibility is of note
because the Allen decision indicates that the lawyers in question had on
Supp. 2002) (providing that a single offense is misdemeanor; multiple or subsequent offenses can be
prosecuted as felony).
39. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-704 (2001).
40. See Michael Higgins, Tempting Targets: Mass-Tort Lawyer Among Those Facing
Criminal Charges, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 26, 26-27 (describing criminal prosecutions in South
Carolina against several prominent Texas personal injury lawyers for local solicitation of possible
victims of air crash); Juliet Eilperin, Crash Solicitation Fallout: Musslewhite Son Cooperates,
Father Defends, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 1997, at A4 (providing news account of South Carolina
criminal prosecution, indicating charged offense was felony of conspiracy to solicit); O'Quinn
Pleads Guilty to PracticingLaw Without a License, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1997, at B 12 (providing a
news account of guilty plea of one of two Texas lawyers charged in South Carolina, who pleaded
guilty to the lesser-included-offense of unauthorized practice, with fines and compulsory
contribution of $250,000 to fund ethics seminars and special prosecutor's unit to investigate
ambulance-chasing); Bob Van Voris, Problems at Home: O'Quinn Fights Off Disbarment Effort,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19, 1998, at A5 (providing news account of the filing of disciplinary petition
against the same Texas lawyers involved in South Carolina solicitation charges).
41. See Exparte Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 99-100 (1861), overruled on
other grounds by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987). Dennison involved a most
unappealing attempt by Kentucky to compel the Governor of Ohio to extradite Dennison for
attempting to assist a Kentucky slave to flee slavery. See id. at 67. The opinion of the Supreme
Court, upholding Kentucky's effort, was written by Chief Justice Taney. See id. at 95. Despite its
tarnished pedigree, Dennison remains the law on the availability of interstate extradition for
misdemeanor offenses. See, e.g., Starks v. Turner, 365 P.2d 564, 565-66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961)
(holding that references to "crime" in the Extradition Clause of Federal Constitution (U.S. CONST.
art. 4, § 2) was authoritatively established by Dennison to include the misdemeanor offense of, here,
writing bad check).
42. See Leslie W. Abramson, Extradition in America: Of Uniform Acts and Governmental
Discretion,33 BAYLOR L. REV. 793, 839 (1981).
43. For similar reasons, state criminal statutes against solicitation are rarely enforced by
prosecutors. See Geyelin, supra note 29 (providing news report of effort by Texas Trial Lawyers
Association to boost penalty for solicitation to felony (from misdemeanor), among other reasons, to
provide incentive to prosecutors to enforce statute).
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occasion appeared in (apparently unrelated) West Virginia litigation,
presumably based on such admissions.M Appearances pro hac vice are a
method of permitting nonlocal lawyers to appear and represent a client
in one matter but not to practice law generally in the state.4 By tradition,
the procedure is limited to representations involving already-filed
litigation. 46 It appears to have arisen out of the procedural mechanics of
entering and recognizing appearances in litigation, rather than out of a
general rulemaking exercise in which the courts of a state (or its
legislature) considered broadly the situations in which it would be
sensible to permit nonadmitted lawyers to practice within the state. As a
result, that sort of admission is broadly available for litigation practice
but is not available for a transactional lawyer who might wish to provide
in-state legal services in nonlitigation settings.' Indeed, it is not
44. See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Allen, 479 S.E.2d 317,335-36 (W. Va. 1996).
45. See generally Pro Hac Vice Admission, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at
21:2006-13 (Nov. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Pro Hac Vice Admission] (canvassing law on pro hac vice
admission in several states). Pro hac vice admission, which is very widely available in general,
often comes with attached restrictions-in some jurisdictions being quite onerous. See id. at
21:2006-07. A restriction found in several states limits the number of such representations per year.
See id. at 21:2009. Most states, of course, will refuse to allow such admissions to become a device
for a resident lawyer to practice locally through such admissions seriatim and without being
otherwise admitted. See, e.g., Brookens v. Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538 A.2d
1120, 1124, 1127 (D.C. 1988) (affirming finding of contempt against District resident, admitted
only in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, who maintained local office for almost a decade and regularly
practiced law there through pro hac vice admissions); S.C. Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting
Ass'n v. Froelich, 377 S.E.2d 306, 308 (S.C. 1989) (per curiam) (refusing to admit and stating that
pro hac vice admission was not device whereby South Carolina resident lawyer, admitted only in
Illinois, could carry on South Carolina litigation practice). More problematic are restrictions that
appear mainly or entirely anticompetitive and protective only of local practitioners. See, e.g., United
States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 815 n.l, 817-18 (1st Cir. 1987) (indicating that
application of local rule limiting pro hac vice appearances to one per year so as to deny out-ofjurisdiction counsel to defendant indicted in two matters offends Sixth Amendment guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel).
46. See ProHac Vice Admission, supra note 45, at 21:2006.
47. On the limitation of pro hac vice admission to litigation, see, for example, Ranta v.
McCarney, 391 N.V.2d 161 (N.D. 1986), in which the court noted the inability of a lawyer to
obtain pro hoc vice admission for nonlitigation work. See id. at 162 n.l. In the notorious case of
Birbrower,Montalbano, Condon & Frank P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d I (Cal. 1998), a New
York lawyer who performed legal services in California at the request of clients who controlled a
California corporation that was involved in arbitration in San Francisco engaged in unauthorized
practice and could not recover fees for work there. See id. at 7. Pro hoc vice admission was
unavailable because arbitration does not involve a court appearance. See id. at 6, 9. Thus, there was
no method that the court would recognize (including association with local counsel) by which the
out-of-state lawyer could have conducted the California arbitration short of being fully admitted to
the California bar. California, along with all other Sun Belt states, does not admit lawyers "on
motion"--that is, admit to local practice a lawyer admitted elsewhere, unless the lawyer succeeds in
qualifying for and passing the state's bar examination. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking
Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional
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available generally for such litigation-like activities as mediation or
arbitration, despite the possible close resemblance of some such
proceedings to litigation.48
Some jurisdictions do treat a pro hac vice admission as, in effect,
submission to the disciplinary authority of the state-but perhaps only
with respect to conduct that occurs in connection with that very
proceeding. 49 In other jurisdictions, which lack comparable disciplinary
Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665, 682 n.47 (1995) [hereinafter Wolfram, Sneaking Around].
Improbably enough, however, some courts have held that representing a client in arbitration does
not constitute the practice of law, and thus may be done by a lawyer from outside the jurisdiction in
which the arbitration is held. See, e.g., Siegel v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera Industrial y
Comercial, No. 90 Civ. 6108 (RJW), 1991 WL 167979, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1991) (holding
that a lawyer not admitted in New York was entitled to recover legal fees for services in
representing client in New York arbitration).
A recent Rhode Island Supreme Court ruling might hold out the possibility of considering
requests by transactional lawyers for situation-by-situation admission pro hac vice for non-litigation
work within the state. See In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62, 64 (R.I. 2001) (providing an indication that the
state's supreme court will, on case-by-case basis, exercise discretion to grant prospective-only
authority to lawyer admitted in another state to engage in law practice in-state before state or
municipal administrative agencies, boards, or commissions). The state supreme court emphasized
that only it, and no other court in the state, could exercise that discretion. See id.
A broader power of nonlitigation pro hac vice admission may also be a possibility
(although thus far untested) under one possible reading of New York's recently amended regulation
on pro hac vice admission. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 520.11 (a)(1) (2000)
(providing that out-of-state lawyer in good standing may be admitted pro hac vice "in the discretion
of any court of record, to participate in any matter in which the attorney is employed" with no stated
limitation of practice to litigation "matters"). The regulation's amendment had been occasioned by a
highly restrictive ruling purporting to limit pro hac vice admissions to the trial of a case only, thus
precluding participation in pretrial work. See Largeteau v. Smith, 603 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63-64 (App.
Div. 1993). But see Johnson v. Mesch Eng'g, P.C., 624 N.Y.S.2d 710, 710 (App. Div. 1995) (ruling
of different appellate court explicitly rejecting Largeteau and holding that pro hac vice admission
applied to pretrial discovery as well as trial itself); People v. Leslie, 662 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764-65
(App. Div. 1997) (ruling by another appellate court following Johnson and rejecting Largeteau).
48. See supranote 47.
49. See, e.g., WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.5(a) (stating that disciplinary authority extends to lawyer
generally admitted to bar as well as to "[a] lawyer allowed by a court of this state to appear and
participate in a proceeding in that court ... for conduct that occurs in connection with that
proceeding"). The West Virginia Supreme Court in the Allen decision alluded to its prior,
unpublished decision in a 1993 case where it had exercised disciplinary jurisdiction over a lawyer
admitted in another state on the ground that his frequent pro hac vice appearances constituted
"regularly engag[ing]" in practice in the state. See Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 335. The court's brief
description does not indicate whether there was any connection between the charged offenses and
the pro hac vice work. A Maryland bar rule, quoted in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hyatt,
490 A.2d 1224 (Md. 1985), referred even more broadly to disciplinary jurisdiction over both locally
admitted lawyers as well as "'a member of the bar of any other state ... who is employed as counsel
in any case"' pending before any court or administrative agency of the state, regardless of admission
pro hac vice or of the regularity of such admissions. Id. at 1227 (quoting Maryland bar rule defining
"attorney").
The Indiana Supreme Court in In re Fletcher, 655 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. 1995) (per curiam),
spoke broadly of its inherent judicial power to regulate any lawyer who practices law in the state
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power, apparently the only remedies are those available in the trial court
in which the pro hac vice lawyer has been admitted or is applying for
admission. In general, trial courts are recognized as having discretion to
revoke a pro hac vice appearance for good cause. Motions for pro hac
vice admission can also be denied in the discretion of the court,"' and
occasionally are denied on the ground that the lawyer's past misconduct
threatens to disrupt the proceedings. 2 And courts in which pro hac vice
lawyers appear can presumably impose on such lawyers contempt or
procedural sanctions of the same kind and on the same terms as are
permitted with locally-admitted lawyers. 3 But, because in most states
based on its own rule of admission giving it power over lawyers locally admitted and a lawyer "who
practices law in this State." Id. at 59. That certainly would include lawyers locally admitted but also
others: "Although [respondent's] pro hac vice admission provides convenient empirical evidence
supporting our finding that he was engaged in the practice of law in this state, our disciplinary
jurisdiction is not grounded solely in his pro hac vice admission. It also arises from his having
practiced law in this state." Id. at 60-61. in fact, in Fletcher,the lawyer admitted pro hac vice was
held subject to discipline for making a knowing false statement of fact to the judge in the very case
in which he was admitted. See id. at 59, 61. However, in In re Murgatroyd,741 N.E.2d 719 (Ind.
2001) (per curiam), the Indiana Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction to accept the agreed
judgment of two California-admitted lawyers who had solicited Indiana clients without compliance
with the Indiana professional rules. See id. at 720, 722. The agreed judgment consisted of an
injunction ordering compliance with all Indiana professional rules in the future, including those
dealing with solicitation. See id. at 722-23.
50. See, e.g., Eagan v. Jackson, 855 F. Supp. 765, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (revoking admission
pro hac vice of New Jersey lawyer representing incompetent ward for lawyer's failure to inform
court of his fee-splitting agreement with guardian of ward, who supported request by lawyer for
enhanced fee; matter also referred to New Jersey court with jurisdiction over estate of ward for
possible report to New Jersey ethics agency); Royal Indem. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., 501 N.E.2d 617,
622 (Ohio 1986) (upholding revocation based on evidence that firm misrepresented facts about
existence of documents sought in subpoena duces tecum); Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin, 622
N.W.2d 436, 449 (Wis. 2001) (upholding revocation as not abuse of discretion on evidence that
lawyer repeatedly exceeded limits on proper forensics and ignored court's rulings and, in another
case, based on revocation of pro hac vice admission in first case).
51. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,441-42 (1979) (per curiam) (holding that lawyer has
no due process right to admission pro hac vice, but that such rests in sound discretion of court).
52. See, e.g., Kohlmayer v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 877, 878 (D.N.J.
2000) (upholding magistrate's denial of pro hac vice admission where lawyer's past conduct in
several recent cases was "uncivilized and unprofessional and ... resulted in reprimands, mistrials
and wasted judicial time"). Two courts have strongly intimated that they will exercise a power to
enjoin a lawyer who has engaged in past inappropriate litigation behavior from pro hac vice
appearance in the future. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
56 (Del. 1993) (inviting Texas lawyer Joseph Jamail to make "a voluntary appearance" to explain
why he should not be barred from appearing in Delaware following egregious misconduct during
Texas representation of deponent in Delaware-based litigation); Fletcher, 655 N.E.2d at 61
(intimating that disciplinary sanctions against pro hac vice lawyer might include injunctive relief,
apparently against further such appearances).
53. See, e.g., Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 562 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding that district court had inherent power to sanction pro hac vice lawyer, based on
lawyer's misrepresentation to court, by preventing counsel from appearing before court on same
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the law on the inherent power of a court to discipline lawyers confines
the subject of lawyer discipline to the state's supreme court,-4 the trial
courts of the state do not have a general, inherent power to discipline pro
hac vice lawyers. The available possibilities thus would obtain only in a
narrow range of cases, situations that are unlikely to have much meaning
under the facts of the Allen decision. If one or more of the lawyers
involved in that decision had been admitted to practice in West Virginia
pro hac vice, the court in which the admission had occurred could
respond to complaints about the lawyer's conduct in that very
litigation.55 Thus, courts could respond to the pro hac vice lawyer's
involvement in solicitation in the very case in which the lawyer was
specially admitted. And, perhaps, a court could deny admission pro hac
vice in a future case because of a demonstrated practice of impermissible
solicitation within the state in prior instances. 6
The pro hac vice extension of the local admission rule is widely
recognized, but its disciplinary implications are even more modest than
the right of courtroom audience that it grants. Typically, disciplinary
objections can be lodged only with the court in which the litigation is
pending, and which entered the order of special admission. That court, of
course, is not the regularly constituted lawyer-disciplinary authority, and
the presiding judge may have neither relevant experience nor disposition
to serve as such. In fact, some decisions indicate that the presiding judge
should not attempt to exercise broad disciplinary powers, but should
single-mindedly confine herself to complaints that threaten the ability of
a party to receive a fair trial in the pending matter or the ability of the
tribunal to provide one. 7 The fact that a disciplinary offense may have
basis in future); Bank of Haw. v. Kunimoto, 984 P.2d 1198, 1213, 1219 (Haw. 1999) (holding that
state's trial courts have inherent power to impose sanctions for abusive litigation practices-here,
warranting revocation of pro hac vice status and requiring lawyers in any future pro hac vice
application to reveal revocation).
54. See generally WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 2.2.4 (stating that the
great majority of state supreme courts refuse to permit lower courts to exercise the supreme court's
inherent power to discipline lawyers).
55. See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Allen, 479 S.E.2d 317,333 n.24, 336 (W. Va. 1996).
56. Cf Kohlmayer, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (upholding denial of pro hac vice admission
because of disruptive trial antics in prior cases). The prospect of denial of future pro hac vice
admission requests by the offending lawyers might have led the West Virginia court in its Allen
decision to go on at such length about the impermissible solicitation that, in the end, the court held
was beyond its sanctioning power. See Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 324-36.
In the federal system, the inherent power of a trial court to impose sanctions on a pro hac
vice lawyer may be more expansive than the corresponding powers of state court judges. See, e.g.,
Baldwin HardwareCorp., 78 F.3d at 562.
57. See, e.g., Hahn v. Boeing Co., 621 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (holding
that trial court had no disciplinary authority, which was reserved exclusively to supreme court, and
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caused serious consequences of another kind-such as harm to
nonparties in the state-would presumably not warrant intervention by
the trial court. In any event, the sanctioning power that the pro hac vice
court can exercise is quite limited. It essentially consists (at the extreme)
of the power to prohibit the lawyer from proceeding further with the
particular representation that is the sole subject of the lawyer's local
admission and, when warranted, contempt or procedural sanctions.58 Due
to the exclusive power of the jurisdiction's supreme court to administer
discipline,59 presumably the pro hac vice court cannot formally prohibit
the lawyer from representing all clients in the state in the future (a
sanction functionally equivalent to pro hac vice disbarment). On the
other hand, at least one state supreme court has intimated that it would
itself deny the right of a lawyer to appear in the state pro hac vice in the
future because of perceived past misconduct. 6°
In sum, in the usual case and in the vast majority of jurisdictions
following the traditional local admission rule, there are few alternative
remedial devices available to impose sanctions on a nonlocal lawyer.
Many of the available devices would be wielded by tribunals not
normally entrusted with lawyer discipline, and the remedy would often
be quite limited and otherwise unlike the remedies available in formal
lawyer-discipline proceedings. For the most part, professional discipline
is, if indirectly, quite emphatically limited to the offending lawyer's
"home" state, the state in which the lawyer is indeed admitted to
practice. There, as I next discuss, there is no reticence about geography
and discipline; in a radical reversal of form, at least the professional
theory broadly admits that a home state lawyer is subject to professional
discipline without regard to the place where the lawyer's allegedly
wrongful act occurred or where its effects were felt. But, as will be next
discussed, there are reasons to doubt that the home state disciplinary
authorities will be regularly interested in visiting their customary level
of diligent prosecution of the locally admitted lawyer for conduct in
another jurisdiction.
thus no power to authorize inquiry into whether lawyer applying for admission pro hac vice had
solicited clients in that case). For further discussion, see supranote 49 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Macdraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 37, 39 (2d
Cir. 1998).
59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 56-57 (Del.
1993) (stating that, while no clear mechanism existed to deal with objectionable advocacy by Texas
lawyer in deposition taken in Texas for Delaware litigation in which lawyer was defending
individual nonparty deponent, court would consider whether lawyer would ever be admitted pro hac
vice in Delaware litigation in future).
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HOME STATE CONCERN WITH OUT-OF-STATE ACTivrrIs OF
LOCAL LAWYERS

A.

Home State DisciplinaryPoliciesand Out-of-State
Lawyer Activities

We turn, then to consider the other, although somewhat theoretical,
possibility: that a lawyer soliciting clients (or committing another
disciplinary offense) away from her state of admission would
nonetheless be disciplined at "home." Under the facts in the Allen
decision, "home" would be the District of Columbia where two of the
lawyers involved in the West Virginia solicitation were admitted to
practice.6' Deferring for a moment the question of the extent of
enforcement, all American jurisdictions assert at least the theoretical
power to punish acts of their locally-admitted lawyers, even if the acts
occurred and caused injury outside the state.62
At one level, such a theoretical stance is not surprising. Unlike, for
example, prosecution for criminal offenses, 63 discipline of lawyers is
suffused with concern about making accurate predictions about future
wrongdoing on the part of the offending lawyer. One of the theories
driving professional discipline is that it seeks to protect clients, the
61. See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Allen, 479 S.E.2d 317, 320 (W. Va. 1996) (stating that
disciplinary charging papers indicated that "Phillip B. Allen was licensed to practice in Ohio and
Illinois and that John P. Coale and Greta C. Van Susteren were licensed to practice in the District of
Columbia).
62. See Developments in the Law: Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1586 (1994). In fact, in Allen itself, the West Virginia court intimated that
continuation of an initial West Virginia instance of solicitation that was carried forward in a hospital
room in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, would be within the regulatory power of the West Virginia court:
Thus, we hold that a lawyer who initially contacts a prospective client who is located in
West Virginia regarding a cause of action that may be initiated in West Virginia courts is
subject to discipline in this State if he or she violates the West Virginia Rules of
Professional Conduct with respect to such prospective client, even if the conduct
constituting a violation occurs outside of our State.
Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 324.
63. It has, of course, always been the case that an objective, perhaps the principal one, of the
law of crime is that of general and specific deterrence. See, e.g., Michael S.Moore, A Taxonomy of
Purposesof Punishment, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 60, 60 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999).
Despite that effort-which is demonstrably not entirely successful-the criminal law and the
criminal justice system do not generally purport to "certify" persons as law-abiding. But, that is
sometimes claimed to be one of the hallmarks of the governmental process of admission to law
practice and professional discipline of lawyers, which presumably necessitates a more or less
constant vigilance about the character and other competence of an admitted lawyer. See, e.g., People
v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 582 n. 13 (Colo. 2001) (quoting Colorado court rule stating that "'[a] license
to practice law is a proclamation by this Court that its holder is a person to whom members of the
public may entrust their legal affairs').
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public, courts, and the legal system against lawyers who, by their
professional misconduct, have shown themselves unwilling or unable to
abide by mandatory constraints spelled out in the lawyer codes, thus
presenting a clear threat of repetition of such violations. 4 That may be
particularly important to a public that might legitimately assume that a
person who was initially accepted into the bar after purportedly thorough
scrutiny of the lawyer's moral and intellectual fitness retains a kind of
certificate of state approval until stripped of that standing.6 In making
that assessment on the occasion of adjudicating a disciplinary charge,
courts place significant emphasis upon the perceived character of the
lawyer in question. This is done in an attempt to determine whether the
lawyer has the kind of character traits that assure that she is minimally
worthy of being entrusted with the responsibilities of law practice or,
differently, appears to be burdened with a major character defect that
portends further ethical lapses.66
For those broad purposes, disciplinary authorities correctly perceive
that a lawyer should be held accountable for wrongful professional acts
wherever they might occur. Perhaps most clearly, a lawyer who commits
a serious crime67 outside the jurisdiction presents a professional risk

64. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS R. 1.1 (1986)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR SANCTIONS] ("The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is
to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will
not discharge, or are unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties to clients, the public,
the legal system, and the legal profession."); WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18,
§ 3.1, at 80-82 (describing general purposes of lawyer discipline).
65. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) ("The power of disbarment is
necessary for the protection of the public in order to strip a man of the implied representation by
courts that a man who is allowed to hold himself out to practice before them is in 'good standing' so
to do."); see also John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
1021, 1023 (1982). Professor Leubsdorf describes a professional ideology that:
Clients were to entrust their affairs to the professional judgment of counsel, who would
serve them with selaess devotion. In turn, the legal profession would protect clients from
ignorance and unreliability by preventing them from hiring anyone not enlightened by a
legal education and warrantied by bar membership. Furthermore, the bar would prevent
abuses by its own members through the establishment and enforcement of rules ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
66. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards For
Imposing Lawyer DisciplineSanctions,48 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 54-55 (1998).
67. On the types of criminal offenses that may result in professional discipline, see
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supranote 18, § 3.3.2, at 92-94 (providing a general survey of
crimes that may result in professional discipline); Criminal Conduct, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA), at 101:301-06 (July 18, 2001) (providing a similar list); see also ABA STANDARDS
FOR SANCTIONS, supra note 64, R. 5.11 (a) (specifying types of serious criminal conduct warranting
disbarment such as theft, fraud and extortion); id. R. 5.12 (stating that criminal conduct not
specified in R. 5.11 generally warrants suspension); id. R. 5.13 (stating that lawyers who knowingly
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equal to that posed by a lawyer whose criminal acts happened to be
committed within the state of admission. Thus, courts uniformly hold
that the place where a serious crime is committed is irrelevant for
purposes of imposing professional discipline in the state where the
lawyer is admitted. 68 That notion, however, is not limited to lawyer
crimes. A home state court may also express concern over the conduct of
a lawyer who engages in a civil wrong, such as fraud,69 or violates a
lawyer code such as by engaging in unauthorized practice, 70 even if the
act constituting the noncriminal wrong is committed outside the state in
which the lawyer is admitted. 7' The notion is enshrined in a provision of
ABA Model Rule 8.5(a), which has been widely adopted and which
provides that "[a] lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of
where the lawyer's conduct occurs. 72

engage in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice, should be reprimanded).
68. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cashman, 629 P.2d 105, 108 (Haw. 1981) (per
curiam) (indicating that conversion of client's funds in California is a basis for discipline in
Hawaii); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Childress, 770 A.2d 685, 694, 696-97 (Md. 2001)
(indicating that despite reversal of federal court conviction on appeal, evidence sufficiently showed
that lawyer had violated Virginia criminal statute against taking "indecent liberties" with children in
Intemet-arranged sexual liaisons with underage girls); In re Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Minn.
1978) (concluding that locally admitted lawyer's commission of fraud in Canada was basis for local
discipline).
69. An interesting testing case is In re Wade, 526 A.2d 936 (D.C. 1987). Lawyer Wade, who
was apparently admitted only in the District of Columbia but who was not a resident and did not
maintain an office there, nonetheless maintained his D.C. license in "active" status. See id. at 938.
While resident in Massachusetts, he misappropriated and converted money entrusted to him by a
client, whom he was representing although not yet admitted in that state. See id. at 937-38. The D.C.
court first rejected Wade's argument that he was not subject to D.C.'s disciplinary power because he
did not fit within what the court agreed was the relevant jurisdictional rule, which subjected to D.C.
discipline "'[a]ny attorney who engages in the practice of law within [D.C.].' Id. at 938 (quoting
D.C. BAR R. XI, § 1). Despite the infelicitous working of the rule, the court held that maintaining
active status constituted such activity, and it then proceeded to disbar Wade. See id. at 939-40.
70. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mbakpuo, 652 N.E.2d 976, 977-78 (Ohio
1995) (affirming suspension of a lawyer who, among other offenses, practiced law from an office in
the District of Columbia, where the lawyer was not admitted).
71. See generally MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 9(A)(2) (stating that
grounds for discipline include "engag[ing] in conduct violating applicable rules of professional
conduct of another jurisdiction"); see also People v. Schindelar, 845 P.2d 1146, 1147 (Colo. 1993)
(en bane) (per curiam) (stating that "an attorney who is a member of the bar of this state must
answer for her professional misconduct even if the misconduct occurs in another jurisdiction"); In
re Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 163, 171 (N.M. 1997) (permitting discipline of locally-admitted lawyer for
acts while functioning as federal prosecutor in District of Columbia).
72. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 8.5(a) (2001) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. The following sentence in Rule 8.5(a) indicates that, in at least some such instances of
nonlocal acts, the lawyer would have been acting as a lawyer in another jurisdiction: "A lawyer may
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Rule 8.5(a) and the decisions are analytically coupled with an even
broader notion under which a lawyer's acts can constitute the basis for
professional discipline in the state of admission even if the "lawyer" acts
in a context having nothing to do with the practice of law (and again, as
stated above, even if the act is not criminal). 3 For example, a person
admitted to practice who is engaged full-time in a business that has
nothing to do with law practice can be disciplined for wrongful acts
committed in the course of that other work, when the act bears the
necessary predictive quality about the lawyer's future practice.74
Typically, such discipline occurs under loosely-worded "catch-all"
provisions of the lawyer codes, sanctioning such amorphous disciplinary
offenses as "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation

''75

or "that is prejudicial to the administration of

justice." 76

Those, obviously, are offenses that may occur in a lawyer's
many possible roles not related to law practice 7' Interestingly, the only
specific textual mention in the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct of impermissible acts beyond a home state's borders is Model
Rule 5.5(a), with its prohibition against a lawyer's engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law in another jurisdiction.78
In the case of a lawyer's authorized practice in another state, the
extraterritorial concern of other states has indeed been formalized in
recent decades, although in only a limited respect. In a former day, when
it was otherwise, those concerned with bar regulation decried the fact
that a lawyer who was disbarred or suspended in one state could

be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction where the
lawyer is admitted for the same conduct." Id.
73. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supranote 18, § 3.3.4, at 97 & n.32.
74. See id. (describing broad acceptance of traditional view that lawyer is subject to
professional discipline for conduct that lawyer engaged in outside his or her role as lawyer); see
also Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1883) (holding lawyer in contempt for participation in
public lynching of prisoner taken from courthouse).
75. MODEL RULES, supra note 72, R. 8.4(c). Model Rule 8.4(b) already proscribes
"commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Id. R. 8.4(b). Thus, Rule 8.4(c) obviously covers many acts of
the described kind that are not also criminal.
76. Id. R. 8A(d). The 1969 ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility stated one further
catch-all provision. It contained a proscription, of the ultimate in breadth, against engaging "in any
other conduct that adversely reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to practice law." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSmILrrY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1969) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. That phrase is not
repeated in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct.
77. On the concern that such broadly worded disciplinary rules not be used to extend the
reach of specific disciplinary standards, see RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supranote 18, § 5 cmt c.
78. See MODEL RULES, supra note 72, R. 5.5(a) (providing that a "lawyer shall not ...
practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction").
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continue to practice law in any other state in which the lawyer was
admitted. 79 The response has been the implementation of a system of
reciprocal discipline.80 In most states, regulations can now be found
under which a locally admitted lawyer must promptly report to the
state's bar disciplinary authorities any imposition of professional
discipline in any other state in which the lawyer is admitted."' That is
supplemented by systematic reporting by jurisdictions when they impose
discipline, including to a national data bank maintained by the ABA.82
Once reported, or otherwise discovered by local bar disciplinary
79. See SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, ABA,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 116-21 (1970) [hereinafter
CLARK REPORT].
80. See generally MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 22 (setting out a model
reciprocal-discipline rule); WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 3.4.6, at 115-17
(discussing system of reciprocal discipline). States also recognize discipline or sanctions imposed in
federal courts for the purposes of reciprocal discipline. See, e.g., Miss. Bar v. Shah, 749 So. 2d
1047, 1049 (Miss. 1999) (en banc) (imposing reciprocal discipline on lawyer based on discipline
imposed in federal bankruptcy court, under state rule so providing for sanctions imposed "by
another jurisdiction"); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Patterson, 28 P.3d 551, 561 (Okla. 2001) (per
curiam) (imposing public censure where court felt that disbarment as reciprocal discipline was too
harsh after lawyer was disbarred by federal appellate court). And, federal courts give respect to state
adjudications of discipline in determining whether the lawyer should also be disciplined in federal
court. See generally Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957) (holding that, while a state's
disbarment judgment "brings title deeds of high respect," the federal district court was not bound to
accept ruling of state court if "right and justice" conflicted with upholding state findings).
The concept of reciprocal discipline is not new. See, e.g., People ex rel. Blackmer v.
Campbell, 58 P. 591, 591 (Colo. 1899) (per curiam) (indicating that lawyer disbarred in Montana
not eligible to be admitted in Colorado on basis of Montana license; Colorado license ordered
revoked on strength of Montana disbarment). For a contemporary cognate in the same jurisdiction,
see People v. Mattox, 862 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1993) (per curiam), where the Colorado Supreme Court
ordered the suspension of a lawyer who failed to disclose on her application for admission to
practice in state that she had been suspended from practice in another jurisdiction. See id. at 276-77.
What is new is systematically paying attention to the possibility of discipline in other jurisdictions
and, to a modest extent, providing for a national data-sharing network to allow earlier detection of
other-state discipline.
81. See generally MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 22(A) (requiring lawyer
subject to discipline in another jurisdiction to notify local disciplinary agency "promptly");
COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, ABA, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A
NEW CENTURY 85 (1992) [hereinafter McKAY REPORT] (setting out a recommendation for such a

system). Some jurisdictions apparently impose a broader reporting obligation, for example including
imposition of procedural sanctions in another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Patterson, 28 P.3d at 560-61
(enforcing (through public censure) rule requiring lawyer to report sanctions (here imposed by outof-state federal court) to state disciplinary office).
82. See MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 16(I) (requiring disciplinary board to
send notice of all public discipline against a lawyer to ABA's National Discipline Data Bank); see
also WASH. RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE R. 11.2(c) (2001) (providing that notice of discipline
is to be given to: (1) lawyer discipline agency in any jurisdiction where lawyer is believed admitted;
(2) chief judge of local federal courts and federal court of appeals; (3) National Discipline Data
Bank of the ABA; (4) the local bar news).
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authorities, a process of imposing reciprocal discipline will be
inaugurated.83 Again, the implicit policy is that professional discipline in
another state-including, of course, such discipline based on acts that
occurred outside the home state-is also a matter of potential
disciplinary concern in each other state in which the lawyer is admitted.
The fact that the violation consisted entirely of conduct that
occurred outside the home state in which the proceeding for reciprocal
discipline is pending does not preclude it. 4 The other-state violation may
indicate indifference to professional obligations on the part of the lawyer
that is a matter of concern in any state in which the lawyer is admitted.
Yet, the local state's regulatory interests should receive appropriate
recognition. That is found, for example, in the general approach that
discipline will not be imposed if the offense is one that does not exist
under the lawyer code of the state asked to impose reciprocal
discipline." Also, New York courts follow the approach in reciprocaldiscipline cases 6 of imposing milder sanctions if the particular facts
indicate that the interests of the state that first initiated disciplinary
proceedings are-all other things considered-greater than local
interests, such that the other state's determinations on discipline should
be primary. That approach would seem appropriate everywhere, at least
where the initially imposed discipline adequately provides deterrence to
the lawyer and protection to the public and public institutions, and if the
circumstances indicate no significant risk of future misconduct in the
state considering reciprocal discipline.

83. See MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 22.
84. See, e.g., In re Carlson, 489 S.E.2d 834, 835 (Ga. 1997) (per curiam) (indicating that
lawyer's felony conviction in Kentucky for flagrant nonsupport of children there involves moral
turpitude requiring disbarment in Georgia); In re Repasky, 731 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. 2001)
(per curiam) (imposing reciprocal discipline on New York lawyer, who was also admitted in
Georgia, where he practiced and (apparently) where the offending acts of neglect occurred).
85. See, e.g., In re Youmans, 588 A.2d 718, 719 (D.C. 1991) (refusing to discipline lawyer
admitted in both D.C. and New Jersey who was disciplined in latter state for offense of depositing
client's advance fee payment into personal account instead of trust account, because D.C. rules
would permit such deposit); In re Lebbos, 672 N.E.2d 517, 519 (Mass. 1996) (noting provision of
Massachusetts disciplinary rules stating that reciprocal discipline is not proper if "the misconduct
established does not justify the same discipline" in Massachusetts).
86. See Repasky, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
87. See, e.g., In re Beltre, 565 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. 1991) (per curiam) (noting the
"generally accepted principle that the state where the respondent lives and practices law has the
greater interest in the particular matter and the public policy considerations relevant to disciplinary
action"). Such a result would seem particularly true in an instance, such as that being discussed, in
which the lawyer is not admitted to practice in the jurisdiction.
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B. Home State Disciplineand Choice-of-Law Considerations
The extraterritorial reach of a state's regulatory power necessarily
poses the question of which state's regulation should apply with respect
to lawyer conduct that has multijurisdictional aspects-wherever may be
located the tribunal that must confront that question. The question, of
course, is the familiar, and often difficult, one of choice of law.88 For
example, a lawyer who is admitted in the State of New Jersey and has an
office there may be admitted pro hac vice 9 for the purpose of conducting
litigation in, say, local courts in the District of Columbia. Imagine that
the lawyer discovers information clearly indicating that the lawyer's
client is engaged in a plot to defraud the opposing party in the course of
settlement discussions. The lawyer code of New Jersey requires the
lawyer to disclose the fraud if necessary to prevent it from occurring,90
but the lawyer code of the District of Columbia prohibits disclosure in
such circumstances. 9' There is, obviously, no way out: the lawyer cannot
comply with both requirements.92 Interestingly, until recently there was
very little guidance in either New Jersey or the District of Columbia, or
anywhere else, about how courts were to go about selecting the rule of
decision on such facts in a disciplinary proceeding. Some intimation of

88. See generally Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Jurisdiction, Choice of Lav, and the Multistate
Attorney, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 799 (1995) (providing a survey of choice of law concerns regarding
lawyer discipline).
89. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
90. See N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)-(2) (1997). New Jersey Rule 1.6(b)
states:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such [otherwise confidential] information to the proper
authorities, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to
prevent the client:
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury
to the financial interest or property of another;
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal.
Id.
91. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)(1), (c)(1) (2000) (providing broad
prohibition against revealing confidence or secret of a client, with no exception for acts of client
threatening financial injury).
92. The ABA's 1983 Model Rules invented the notion of a lawyer's "noisy withdrawal" from
a representation. See MODEL RULES, supra note 72, R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2001) ("Neither this Rule nor
Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and
the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like."). The
concept is generally regarded, and properly so, as simply a less candid and more problematic
method of permitting lawyer disclosure adverse to a wrongdoing client for self-protective reasons.
See, e.g., 1 HAZARD & HODES, supranote 25, §§ 9.30-9.31.
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how to proceed can be found in scattered decisions,93 but lawyers have
complained that general choice-of-law standards (ironically enough, the
same indeterminate standards that lawyers must apply to legal questions
involving multijurisdictional activities of their own clients) were
unreasonably opaque and open-ended when applied to lawyer
discipline.9' In response, the ABA amended its Model Rule 8.5 in
August 1993 and, in effect, adopted a proposed legislative rule to govern
choice-of-law issues in lawyer discipline cases. 9 The rule has been
criticized by scholars as simplistic and overly rigid.96 To date it has been
adopted in only a few jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia
(the home jurisdiction of the drafter of the ABA's model rule on
the subject). 97 The scholarly criticism of the extant ABA rule is
93. See, e.g., In re Gil, 656 A.2d 303,305 (D.C. 1995) (announcing rule that court would look
to law of any jurisdiction in which lawyer could have been prosecuted in determining whether
misconduct was "criminal act"); In re Hoffman, 379 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Minn. 1986) (per curiam)
(employing governmental-interest analysis theory of choice of law to determine whether law of
Minnesota, the residence and place of business of both lawyer and client and place of fee contract,
or Alaska, where injury occurred and where worker compensation commission made award and had
rule limiting lawyer's fee in such proceeding, should apply to question of whether fee was legal).
Most of the few decisions that exist involve remedies other than lawyer discipline. See, e.g.,
Glidden Co. v. Janderoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 470-72 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (showing a choice of law
analysis in determining applicability of attorney-client privilege); Holbrook v. Andersen Corp., 756
F. Supp. 34, 39-40 (D. Me. 1991) (approving a settlement of minor's tort claim and determination of
lawyer's fees); Frost v. Lotspeich, 30 P.3d 1185, 1186-87 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (involving a
controversy bvtween Oregon and California lawyers over enforcement of a fee-splitting agreement);
cf 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SmITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 32.5, at 153-55 (4th ed.
1996) (discussing choice-of-law considerations in legal malpractice litigation). As with choice of
law generally, on some occasions courts are able to ignore the issue because the lawyer codes in
question are the same. See, e.g., In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 167-68 (N.M. 1997) (per curiam)
(finding no conflict, where New Mexico anticontact rule was same as rule of District of Columbia,
with respect to activities of locally-admitted lawyer serving as federal prosecutor in District of
Columbia).
94. See generally Arvid E. Roach II, The Virtues of Clarity: The ABA's New Choice of Law
Rule for Legal Ethics, 36 S.TEX. L. REV. 907 (1995) (providing a defense and exposition of the
ABA's new choice-of-law rule by its draftsman); Comm. on Counsel Responsibility, ABA, Risks of
Violation of Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility by Reason of the Increased DisparityAmong the
States, 45 Bus. LAw. 1229, 1237 (1990) (decrying absence of "very specific rules" on choice of law
to guide lawyers).
95. See MODEL RULES, supranote 72, R. 8.5.
96. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in MultijurisdictionalPractice-Is
Model Rule 8.5 the Ansiver, an Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S.TEx. L. REv. 715, 787-88
(1995) (criticizing Model Rule 8.5(a) as then recently amended); Rensberger, supranote 88, at 83335 (providing another criticism of Model Rule 8.5); Susanna Felleman, Note, EthicalDilemmas and
the Multistate Lawyer: A ProposedAmendment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct,95 CoLum. L. REv. 1500, 1501 (1995).
97. See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 8.5 (2000); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDucT R. 8.5 (1998); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-105 (2001). The new D.C.
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telling." The world would, of course, be a better place if it were possible
to craft clear and workable choice-of-law rules for lawyers' practice (just
as it would be for any other business group whose work touches on more
than one jurisdiction). But the ABA rule is neither as clear as is
advertised nor workable in many possible applications. In any event, the
specifics of a choice-of-law rule for lawyer discipline are grist to be
ground on another occasion. 9
The overall contemporary picture, then, is anomalous. The lawyer
codes themselves are worded both vaguely and broadly so as to spread
their regulatory net over a very wide array of lawyer behavior, including
(at least potentially) much conduct that is not committed in the course of
or even with a direct relationship to law practice.' °° Given regulatory
concern about a lawyer's character and future threat to clients and
others, that net is not bounded by state, or even national, lines of
governmental authority. For the purpose of both the specific and the
catch-all provisions of the lawyer codes, it is not decisive that the
offending conduct occurs in-state or out-of-state. '°' Yet, with respect to
regulatory jurisdiction, a state following traditional doctrine will only
entertain a proceeding to impose discipline if the lawyer is locally
admitted, wherever the offending acts may have occurred'02 Local acts,
apparently regardless of their egregiousness or their threat to local
persons or institutions, are not subject to the disciplinary power of local
courts (again, in the absence of local admission of the offending

rule continues the concept of local admission in amended D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 8.5(a):
A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority
of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer may be
subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction
where the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct.
Id. (emphasis added). The new D.C. Rule 8.5(b) then provides a rule governing choice of law in
such instances, although the rule does not explicitly mention the possibility of disciplinary authority
based on something other than local admission. See id. R. 8.5(b).
98. The few D.C. decisions under its choice-of-law rule have presented relatively
straightforward choices, so that the rule must be considered as yet untested. See, e.g., In re
Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1027, 1029 (D.C. 2001) (indicating that a lawyer, admitted in both D.C.
and Virginia, moved to withdraw from Virginia litigation by making disclosures that clearly
violated the lawyer codes of both jurisdictions; lawyer code of Virginia applied to find violation).
99. The approach of the Restatement is to reject rigid approaches such as those of ABA
Model Rule 8.5(a). See RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supra note 18, § 5 cmt. h (explicitly rejecting the
approach of the amended Rule 8.5(a)). Instead, the Comment expresses a preference for the general
approach of the conflicts restatement.
100. See supranotes 74-78 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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lawyer).' 3 In short, a lawyer code of apparently powerful and
inescapable application is, in the final analysis, confined in its operation
to those lawyers who have been sufficiently law-abiding to go through
the elaborate ceremonies required for local admission. As the waggish
comment has it, there is something wrong with that picture.
V. HISTORICAL ORIGINS AN) DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOcAL
ADMISSION LIMITATION
The anomalous limit imposed by traditional doctrine on state power
over lawyers admitted only elsewhere is self-inflicted, and it arose in a
world of law practice and bar discipline very different from that now
confronting lawyers and bar disciplinary officials. Unfortunately, it
continues to be enforced largely in a casual and unthinking way. Without
delving too deeply into the history of pre-twentieth century lawyer
regulation, suffice it to say that the earliest forms of that regulation in
the United States were entirely congenial with the local admission rule.
Indeed, it would be anachronistic to expect that the rule then would have
been anything else. The entire object of admission to a bar was
acceptance into local practice before a particular court, an admission
process that sometimes had to be repeated in many "bars" in the same
state-perhaps on a county-by-county basis.'04 Correlatively, the entire
point of lawyer discipline as it was then was to "dis-" bar a lawyer-to

103. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, 490 A.2d 1224, 1227 (Md. 1985).
104. At an earlier time in Virginia, for example, it might have been necessary for a lawyer to
obtain two certificates. One was from a court indicating that the lawyer was competent to practice
law; apparently this could be obtained from any judge. The other was required to be obtained from a
judge of the court of the county in which the lawyer resided, attesting to the lawyer's good
reputation. See Leigh's Case, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 468, 481 (1810). The latter certificate, obviously,
was to assure a more firmly grounded judicial attestation about reputation.
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remove his' °5 name from the list of those enrolled and thus authorized to
practice before the local court. 1°6
Over time, the notion developed that local admission was exclusive,
in two senses. First, the admitted lawyer enjoyed the positive advantage
of right of audience before the court. Second, and eventually of great
competitive import for lawyers, that permission was accompanied by a
judge-made rule of state constitutional law that left judges with the
exclusive power to delineate exclusive rights for those lawyers who had
been admitted to the court's bar. °7 For most of American legal history
until the end of the nineteenth century, there was no indication that this
exclusive right extended beyond the courthouse. For the most part,
formally-admitted lawyers and only those lawyers could represent
clients in court.' °8 It has only been within the last century, that courts
developed the much more ambitious project of excluding nonadmitted
persons (including nonadmitted lawyers) from practicing law outside the
courthouse.' 9 It is this regulatory realm that has come to be encased in
105. We have been taught to believe there were no "her" lawyers in those early times, and that
the first woman lawyers were admitted to practice only late in the nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 1.4.3, at 11-12 (stating "[a]t common law
women were ineligible to practice law" and implying that first female American lawyers were
admitted in the 1870s). That understanding of history is apparently wrong, or at least
underinclusive, in that it ignores earlier (if, perhaps, not formally-licensed) women practitioners. A
historian has shown that there were many women who practiced law in colonial times, and many of
them enjoyed illustrious and successful professional careers as legal practitioners. See KAREN
BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO THE PRESENT
3-38 (1986). It may be, however, that such pioneering practitioners flourished in work that did not
require formal admission to the bar, such as law-office practice, or in jurisdictions where admission
requirements were either momentarily relaxed or nonexistent.
106. Disbarment was a concept carried over from colonial England. See Ex parte Burr, 4 F.
Cas. 791, 794 (C.C.D.C. 1823) (No. 2186) (citing English precedents to demonstrate that power of
court to discipline lawyer was carried to Maryland, the state whose law was applicable in the
District of Columbia, as part of English common law). Instances of disbarment are found among
early postcolonial decisions of the state and federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 27 F.
Cas. 595, 597 (C.C.D.C. 1812) (No. 16,072); In re Anonymous, 7 N.J.L. 162, 164 (1824). The
lesser sanction of temporary suspension from practice for less serious professional offenses was an
alternative remedy. See, e.g., Burr,4 Fed. Cas. at 793 (citing Maryland statute of 1719 providing for
disbarment, temporary suspension, or fine not exceeding 4000 pounds of tobacco); Reilly v.
Cavanaugh, 32 Ind. 214, 218 (1869). Only in the latter part of the twentieth century did courts
exercise much imagination in shaping remedies beyond disbarment or suspension to deal with
particular kinds of lawyer misconduct and problems. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS,
supra note 18, § 3.5.7, at 139-41 (discussing alternatives to disbarment or suspension, such as
conservatorship, probation and supervised practice, retraining, costs, fines, and other monetary
sanctions).
107. See Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turfand Lawyer Regulation: The Role of the InherentPowers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 1, 3 (1989) [hereinafter Wolfram, Lawyer Turi].
108. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 15.1.1, at 824.
109. See id. § 15.1.3, at 837-45.
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the law of unauthorized practice-a realm over which courts both have
created powerful tools for enforcement and have claimed an exclusive
right to define its boundaries."0 The net effect was that nonadmitted
lawyers and laypersons who wished to provide law-related services that
were judicially defined as the unauthorized practice of law were denied
both the right of audience as well as the right of out-of-court
representation extended to locally-admitted lawyers. The development of
that exclusionary notion of unauthorized practice did not begin in
American law until the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries."' It
was only recently that doctrines were developed precluding nonlawyers
from providing what we have come to think of as exclusively "lawyer
services" in nonlitigation work. During most of American history prior
to the twentieth century, a great deal of transactional work-such as the
preparation of deeds, mortgages, bonds, contracts, wills, and similar
documents-was performed by nonlawyers, such as notaries public,
justices of the peace, minor courthouse officers, or simply literate men
and women with copies of ubiquitous form books at hand."2
110. See RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supra note 18, § I cmt. c (describing holdings in many
states that state constitutional power of courts to regulate lawyers is exclusive of other branches of
state government); Eugene Gressman, Inherent Judicial Power and Disciplinary Due Process, 18
SErON HALL L. REv. 541, 542 (1988); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105
HARV. L. REV. 799, 801 (1992); wolfram, Lawyer Turf, supra note 107, at 6-7 (generally
describing and critiquing negative aspect of inherent-powers doctrine). On use of the negativepower concept to strike down legislative attempts to reshape the notion of unauthorized practice, see
Martinez v. Albuquerque Collection Services, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1495 (D.N.M. 1994), applying New
Mexico constitutional law and striking down a statute purporting to regulate the unauthorized
practice of law by a collection agency as interfering with the inherent power of the state's supreme
court. See id. at 1503; cf Haymond v. Lundy, No. CIV.A. 99-5048, 2000 WL 1824174, at *1-2
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2000) (applying Pennsylvania law, holding that state statute permitting claim
against state bar member for aiding and abetting unauthorized practice offends state supreme court's
exclusive power to regulate lawyers and is unconstitutional under state constitution). Only rarely
will a state's constitution expressly confer on its highest court jurisdiction to regulate the
unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4 (granting state supreme court original
jurisdiction with respect to "the unauthorized practice of law"). Occasional decisions will accept
legislative enactments dealing with unauthorized practice on the ground of comity. See, e.g.,
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Employers Unity, Inc., 716 P.2d 460, 464 (Colo. 1986) (en
bane) (holding constitutional a statute that confirmed the fifty-year-old practice of nonlawyers to
represent clients before state department of labor).
111. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 15.1.1, at 825-26. At the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the American doctrine of unauthorized practice, as applied to
out-of-court work by nonlawyers, was generally much more preclusive of nonlawyer interference
with money-making opportunities for lawyers than is true of the law of virtually any other
industrialized country.
112.

See CtARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4-5 (1966). Perennial best

sellers during a great part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in America were variations on
the English concept of a "conductor generalis"--a formbook that was designed (almost certainly by
one or more lawyer authors, as they invariably claimed) to be used in most of the everyday drafting
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While most modem instances of unauthorized practice involve
entirely uncredentialed nonlawyers," 3 it has long been recognized that
lawyers who are otherwise credentialed may themselves offend
unauthorized practice restrictions. A violation occurs when a lawyer
admitted in, say, the District of Columbia, attempts to practice law in,
say, West Virginia. That notion is expressed in the lawyer codes of
apparently every state,'14 by means of the rule that prohibits a lawyer
locally admitted from practicing in another jurisdiction in circumstances
constituting the unauthorized practice of law where the practice
occurs.15 Because activities of a D.C. lawyer practicing law in West
Virginia without a local license would constitute unauthorized practice,
one might expect to find instances of enforcement at least somewhat
proportional to the extent of such unauthorized across-borders practice.
In fact, reported decisions involving home state prosecution of such an
offense are extremely rare." 6 On the other hand, anecdotal and
impressionistic evidence indicates that such unauthorized out-of-state
practice by lawyers, if not entirely commonplace, is probably at least

situations that had legal significance. See, e.g., ANONYMOUS, A NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS
(Albany 1803). The long title of the work continues "Being a Summary of the Law Relative to the
Duty and Office of Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Coroners, Constables, Jurymen, Overseers of the
Poor, etc., etc. With ... a Variety of Practical Forms ... Which Will Be Found Useful to Citizens,
Lawyers and Magistrates." Id. The anonymous author is identified on the title page only as "A
Gentleman of the Law." Id. The earliest of such a Conductor Generalis was printed in Philadelphia
in 1722. See Alfred L. Brophy, "Ingenium Est Fated Per Quos Profeceris:" Francis Daniel
Pastorius' Young Country Clerk's Collection and Anglo-American Legal Literature 1682-1716, 3
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 637, 640 n.5 (1996). These were near copies of works of the same
name that were quite popular in England during the same period. See Eben Moglen, Taking the
Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1097-98 (1994).
113. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 15.1.3, at 836-37.
114. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-300(B) (1994); D.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2000); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2001); MODEL CODE,
supra note 76, DR 3-101(3) & EC 3-9 (1969). See generally Out-of-State Attorneys, Laws. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at 21:2001 (Nov. 22,2000).
115. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 72, R. 5.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not: (a) practice
law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction .... ).
116. For such rare instances, see In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600 (D.C. 1992) (per curiam), where
a D.C.-admitted lawyer was suspended for a particularly egregious attempt to open an office in
Maryland for the full-time practice of law without being admitted there, see id. at 601, 605, and In
re Schrader,523 S.E.2d 327 (Ga. 1999) (per curiam), where the Georgia Supreme Court suspended
a lawyer admitted in Georgia but not New York, following a New York conviction for filing a
probate matter in New York without obtaining admission pro hac vice, even though the facts
showed that the lawyer had moved to New York and was in the process of applying for admission
generally, see id. at 327-28.
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widespread." 7 Occurring outside the courthouse, there is no ready
judicial monitor. Being of questionable legality, it presumably does not
get trumpeted about by the peripatetic practitioner. Like most
surreptitious activities, it is unlikely that reliable statistics on incidence
could be generated. If the intuited statistic is accurate, why, then, the
lack of in-state enforcement? The reasons, which I have speculated
about elsewhere," probably have much to do with home state regulatory
interests (as well as the relative absence of complaints from either clients
or lawyer colleagues). Even if an offense of unauthorized practice in a
distant state is provable, in most instances there will be simply little or
nothing for the home state to gain by prosecuting its own lawyers for an
activity that would be entirely unobjectionable if performed within the
state. Given the out-of-state location (and, presumably, impact) of the
activities, the matter will most often be considered to be largely if not
entirely of substantive interest only to the state in which the activity

occurred." 9
Regulatory fixation of local admission as the hook on which to
hang lawyer discipline continued, indeed was significantly reinforced,
by the rise of local and state bar associations during the last decades of
the nineteenth century.'l That period of a surge of foundings of bar
associations is customarily dated with the founding of the first
significant American bar association in continuous existence-the

117. See Wolfram, Sneaking Around, supranote 47, at 685-86. The matter has, of course, been
brought very much to a head by the decision of the California Supreme Court in Birbrower,
Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998). In Birbrower,the
court held that New York lawyers who followed directions of long-time New York clients to go to
California to assist one of clients' corporate entities in a California-based contract dispute were
engaged in unauthorized practice in that state. See iL at 7. Therefore, they could not recover unpaid
fees from the client that was suing the firm in California for malpractice in allegedly settling the
dispute unfavorably. See id. Birbrower has become a household term in most law offices and
occasioned the appointment of an ABA commission to investigate how to deal with the problem of
interstate transactional lawyering. See generally COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICrIONAL PRACTICE,
ABA,
INTERIM
REPORT
(2001),
available
at
http://www.abanet.orglcpr/mjpfinal_interimreport.doc (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
118. See Wolfram, Sneaking Around, supra note 47, at 686-87.
119. For the way, in general, in which resource-allocation decisions of bar disciplinary officials
affects in-state discipline, see infra text accompanying note 204.
120. On the history of local and state bar associations, see generally WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS, supranote 18, § 2.3. See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 561-63 (1973); JAMEs ILLARD HURST, THE GROwTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS
285-88 (1950); HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION 18741974, at 35 (1974).
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Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1870."2' For the first
half-century or so of the ensuing period, bar organizations functioned as
private and exclusive organizations. They were set up as
nongovernmental, private organizations, and they were, by conscious
design, not democratically representative of all segments of the bar. 2" In
fact, during the period of bar association founding and the consolidation
of their political and social power, their right to exclude some segments
of the bar was jealously guarded and rigorously exercised.' 3 The
accompanying island-mentality of bar-organization leaders made it quite
congenial to think of nonmember lawyers as foreigners (sometimes for
literally anti-"foreigner" reasons in a nativist or jingoistic sense). 2 4 For
such a mentality, it was sufficient punishment for the bar's purpose that
such unworthy lawyers were outside the club or, when (rarely) found
necessary, thrust into that alien void through disbarment or suspension."
Bar associations gradually transmogrified into somewhat more
democratic, more inclusive, organizations in the latter part of the
twentieth
century.
Discrimination
in granting
membership
correspondingly lessened and then largely ceased.1 16 But it did not signal
unwillingness to think of excluding lawyers through discipline. The
transformation was part of a larger process, which saw the rise of socalled "integrated bars" 2 7 -or, to use a term that carries less risk of
confusion, "mandatory bars"' 2 -along with an even more profound
transformation of the process through which lawyers were disciplined.
The mandatory bar movement can confidently be traced to North
Dakota, whose bar was made mandatory in 1921.29 The pattern adopted
in North Dakota was generally followed elsewhere in the thirty-some

121. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 2.3, at 33. The American Bar
Association was part of the same flurry of organizational births, being founded shortly thereafter, in
1878. See id. § 2.3, at 34.
122. See id.; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 120, at 563-64; HURST, supra note 120, at 288-89.
The ABA remains only partly democratic. Many of its institutional structures and its overall
membership are hardly consistent with broadly participatory notions. See WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 2.3, at 35.
123. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 123 (1976).
124. See id. at 121-29.
125. See id. at 128.
126. See James E. Molitemo, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 781, 814 (1997).
127.

See, e.g., DAYTON DAVID McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 21-22 (1963); HURST, supra

note 120, at 292-93; WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supranote 18, § 2.3, at 36-38.
128. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 2.3, at 36-38.
129. See 1921 N.D. Laws ch. 25, § 1; McKEAN, supra note 127, at 40-44.
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states that eventually accepted the mandatory bar concept. 30 Every
lawyer admitted in the state was required to gain and then maintain
current membership in the state's bar association as a condition of local
admission in good standing.' That, of course, could not have been
achieved by a private-club bar, which would obviously lack such
coercive power even if it had wished to possess it. Instead, the state bar
was reconstituted as a quasi-state agency, 32 either by legislation or by
direct order of the state's supreme court, and membership in the
organization was made mandatory for all lawyers who wished to practice
in-state.'9 Even in states that did not adopt the mandatory bar approach,
effective centralization of control over the lawyer disciplinary process
was achieved, typically through a system of mandatory annual
registration with the jurisdiction's highest court, 34 together with
formalization of the bar disciplinary mechanisms.
Whether organized as a quasi-state agency or as a private club with
a substantial public role, bar associations during this same time moved
substantially into the business of regulating lawyers. In the early years of
bar associations in the late nineteenth century, their involvement in
lawyer discipline had been largely reactive, ad hoe, and episodic. In
practice, the involvement was limited to voluntary activity in isolated
130. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supranote 18, § 2.3, at 37.
131. See 1921 N.D. Laws ch. 25, § 1.
132. On the extent to which the "quasi" is a required term, see WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS, supra note 18, § 2.4.2, at 42-44, which discusses whether state bars are "state actors" for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil rights statutes. In approving the
constitutionality of mandatory state bars, the United States Supreme Court has noted the supportive
state's "interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services."
Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990).
133. See generally WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 2.3, at 36-38
(describing mandatory bars). The institution of a mandatory bar has withstood constitutional attack
on free association grounds. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 845 (1961) (plurality
opinion) (indicating that there is no free association right not to be compelled to join mandatory bar
as condition of law practice); Morrow v. State Bar, 188 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying
the Lathrop rule), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1156 (2000); gf. Keller, 496 U.S. at 16 (stating First
Amendment limitations on extent to which mandatory bar can use members' dues for political and
ideological activities); Romero v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 204 F.3d 291, 297-98 (lst
Cir. 2000) (reading Keller as providing additional ground of attack on mandatory bar activitiesone based on claim that activity, here funding of mandatory life insurance group policy, was not
germane to organization's purposes). On the role of the inherent-powers doctrine in empowering
state supreme courts in many jurisdictions to act with almost plenary and exclusive power with
respect to lawyers and their regulation, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
134. On annual registration as a way of recording the names and addresses of all lawyers
currentiy practicing in a jurisdiction and, not at all coincidentally, collecting a levy to support the
activities of the bar (particularly the expensive process of bar discipline), see, for example, MODEL
DISCIPLINARY RuLEs, supra note 7, R. 8(E), which provides a model rule for adoption by state
supreme courts for the registration process.
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instances of notorious lawyer misconduct.'35 But, particularly in the last
third of the twentieth century, lawyer discipline became more
permanent, regulatory, and routinized. That occurred through major
structural reforms that occurred at various times over the period. One of
those major reforms was that official requirements for lawyer conduct
were formalized and made much more explicit through adoption of
increasingly regulatory and mandatory lawyer codes. 136 Formalization of
the process was attempted initially through adopting whatever existing
structure of lawyer discipline that was already in place. That primarily
consisted of a widely-shared set of concepts that were as shapeless and
formless as the common law itself. For most of the history of the
American bar, lawyer discipline has been conducted under an
assumption that a minimally-qualified practitioner will be sufficiently
advised of what is expected by way of required lawyer behavior from the
example and otherwise-expressed preferences of established lawyer
colleagues. 37' Only quite recently in that history has any attempt been
made to specify in anything approaching exhaustive form the conduct
that is required of lawyers. Until 1969, the usual resort 138 was to the
135. Nineteenth century lawyer discipline operated entirely episodically and without any
organizational oversight or stimulus. Most of the reported cases involve lawyers caught inflagrante
delicto, as the result of the filing of either criminal or civil charges against them-decisions
obviously made by prosecuting authorities or private litigants. While the disbarment prosecutions
would be pressed by other lawyers, there is no indication that the lawyers represented any formal
lawyer organization or were following policies established by such an organization. The
prosecution, of course, may have been organized on an ad hoe basis and might well have
represented the consensus of the lawyers who regularly rode circuit together with a particular court
or who kept up regular social and professional contact of an unorganized kind. Indeed, in Indiana at
least it was possible for a private person to include a count seeking disbarment in what was
otherwise a civil action against a lawyer seeking damages or another remedy for an alleged wrong.
See Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 32 Ind. 214, 218 (1869) (holding that lawyer-respondent had right to jury
trial in his mixed defense of counts against him seeking disbarment under statute together with civil
monetary relief).
136. I engage in shorthand in what follows. It took more than ABA action, of course, to make
the lawyer codes official and, ultimately, regulatory. That was accomplished in the great majority of
states by persuading the state's highest court (or, rarely-as in Georgia-its legislature) to adopt a
version of the ABA model lawyer code as local law. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS,
supra note 18, § 2.6.2, at 55-56.
137. See id. § 2.1, at 20.
138. Some states, such as California, for a long time placed heavy reliance on statutory
regulations. In California's discipline cases well into the twentieth century, courts relied primarily
on the duties of lawyers enumerated in the statutorily prescribed "lawyer's oath." See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6067 (West 1990) (providing the current version of lawyer's oath). Over time,
California's lawyer discipline has moved toward much greater reliance on court and bar-generated
rules, currently the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The ABA's 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct were, in part, based explicitly on provisions of the then-existing California
Rules (as was, for example, the title of the ABA Rules). The California Rules, in turn, have more
recently been amended to adopt some (hut not all) of the changes inaugurated by the ABA's 1983
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ABA's 1908 Canons of Ethics, which were probably not intended by
then bar leaders to be employed for explicitly regulatory purposes1 39 and
were widely criticized as inadequate for such a purpose."4 More
recently, in 1969 ' and again in 1983,142 the ABA engaged in a much
more self-conscious process of crafting rules for the explicit purpose of
imposing norms that could be enforced against lawyers through official
discipline.
Other relevant reforms of the process of lawyer discipline during
the twentieth century were procedural and administrative. At least at the
beginning of the period of increased attention to bar discipline (starting

in the 1920s and 1930s), it was not uncommon to find bar associations
formally deputized by the state's highest court to prosecute bar
disciplinary cases through bar association hearings that were then
reviewed in the state's highest court itself.43 Particularly in jurisdictions
in which the prosecuting bar organization remained elitist, the
arrangement produced predictable outcries that targets of lawyer
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (effective May 27,
1989, as amended). With the greater specificity of rules, the California courts no longer
acknowledge the lawyer's oath statute as an independent source of discipline offenses, with the
exception of its prohibition of a willful violation of a court order. See Read v. State Bar, 807 P.2d
1047, 1049 (Cal. 1991). California courts typically show a tendency to keep the ABA's Model
Rules and the ABA's interpretation of them at some distance. See, e.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v.
WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 807 (CL App. 1999) (holding that, while California courts may
consider provisions of ABA Model Rules as a collateral source for guidance where no direct
California authority exists, lawyer cannot be sanctioned for violation of an ABA ethics committee
formal opinion, as the Model Rules do not establish obligatory standard in the state).
139. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 2.6.2, at 54. Such an explicitly
regulatory role for a moral code generated by a private organization of only a small fraction of the
nation's lawyers (in 1908) could not possibly have been imagined by the Canons' drafters. On the
other hand, they well might have hoped that it would influence the degree of disciplinary effort and
perhaps its direction. See id. § 2.6.2, at 55 & n.32.
140. See id. § 2.6.2, at 54,56.
141. See MODEL CODE, supra note 76, pmbl.
142. See MODEL RULES, supranote 72, scope.
143. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
Ethics-. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 476 (2001) (describing early, modest
involvement of bar associations in lawyer discipline). In the older pattern, prosecution of bar
discipline cases was undertaken by lawyers in private practice on a pro bono basis. Today, in most
states, bar discipline cases are prosecuted by full-time and professional disciplinary lawyers. See,
e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalizationof American Legal Ethics-I!. The
Modem Era, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2002). Again, the professionalization of
disciplinary prosecutors was a key recommendation of the CLARK REPORT, supra note 79, at 48-56.
See also WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 3.2, at 85. The recent MCKAY
REPORT, supranote 81, found that almost all states had at least one full-time disciplinary counsel,
see id. at 96, but that several states still relied heavily on lawyer-volunteers for intake, investigation,
or presentation of charges, which the report found inconsistent with the ABA's standards. See id.
at 96-97.
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regulation tended disproportionately to be nonmembers of the bar
organization that was inflicting the pain or at least persons, such as solo
practitioners, who were not strongly represented in the leadership of
the bar.'44
The searing indictment of then-prevalent bar disciplinary practices
by the so-called Clark Report of the ABA in 1970,' ' caused a further,
and again relevant, transformation of the bar disciplinary apparatus in
almost all states. In response to the Clark Report, the ABA
recommended, and many states adopted, what became the ABA's46
formally elaborated administrative blueprint for ideal bar regulation.'
The new system was implemented through a quasi-independent bar
disciplinary board, which was constituted to function somewhat
independently both of state and local bar associations (including, where
relevant, the state's mandatory bar association) and, for different
reasons,147 also independent of the state's supreme court. That new
pattern, however, explicitly retained the older regulatory and
jurisdictional basis (and limitation) of lawyer discipline-that of local
admission.' 48 Indeed, that basis was made more explicit in many states
by the adoption of the state's lawyer-registration system 49 Those, in
effect, broke off bar regulatory functions from local bar associations by,
in effect, reconstituting the idea of a judicial "roll" of lawyers,'50 so that
discipline or suspension could take the form of permanent or temporary
disenrollment of a lawyer for a disciplinary offense.
None of the disciplinary transformations gave significant reason to
challenge the concept of local admission as the jurisdictional basis for
lawyer discipline. Only a small minority of states has shown an
inclination to break away from the prevailing mindset. An example is
Vermont, which on March 9, 1999, published new Rules of Professional

144. See CLARK REPORT, supranote 79, at 46-47.
145. See id.
146. See MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, at xi. The 1989 model rules on
disciplinary structure and procedures were, in turn, a reworking of the ABA's initial regulatory
response to the Clark Report. See id. The 1989 rules similarly built on standards for selecting
disciplinary sanctions adopted in the same year. See id.
147. The reason for independence from the bar was to avoid the contamination of bar politics.
See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 3.2, at 82-83. The reason for
independence from the judiciary was due process concerns that would otherwise be produced if the
same courts that reviewed imposition of bar discipline were intimately involved in prosecuting the
cases. See id.
148. See id. § 2.3, at 36-37.
149. See id. § 2.3, at 38.
150. On the process of registration, see id., discussing registration process as fundraising
measure, but erroneously implying that registration was limited to nonmandatory bar states.
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Conduct,'5 ' some of which departed from the ABA rule, which, of
course, the jurisdiction was otherwise following as a model. One of
those was Vermont Rule 8.5(b)(2)(iii),'5 2 which now provides with

respect to nonlitigation activities that, if a lawyer "is not licensed to
practice in Vermont and engages in the practice of law in Vermont, the
rules to be applied shall be the rules of Vermont.'"" While not clearly
written to reach that far, the rule was apparently intended by its drafter to
reach conduct such as in-state solicitation of clients by telephone by an
out-of-state lawyer.154
Vermont is not alone. In California, home to both the Birbrower 55
decision and roughly ten percent of the nation's lawyers' 6-- the

mandatory lawyer code for several years has stated plainly that it applies
both to members of the state bar as well as to others. Rule 1-100(D),5 7
entitled "Geographic Scope of Rules," after stating the local admission

rule that "[t]hese rules shall govern the activities of members [of the
state bar] in and outside this state,' 5 8 provides as follows: "As to

lawyers from other jurisdictions who are not members: These rules shall
also govern the activities of lawyers while engaged in the performance
of lawyer functions in this state .... "59

151. See VT. RuLEs OFPROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2000).
152. See id. R. 8.5(b)(2)(iii). The rule is somewhat misleadingly titled "Choice of Law."
Id. R. 8.5(b).
153. Id. R. 8.5(b)(2)(iii). In context, the "rules" being referred to throughout Rule 8.5(b) are the
"rules of professional conduct," as stated in the lead-in line.
154. That indeed is the one example given in the unofficial reporter's note appended to
Vermont's Rule 8.5: "The provision is intended to reach conduct such as telephone solicitation by
out-of-state lawyers that violates the Vermont rules." Id. R. 8.5 reporter's note. The reporter's note
also indicates that the Vermont rule had no counterpart in either the superseded Vermont Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility or the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See id. The note's
assumption that the disciplinary offense of solicitation is included within the category of activities
of a lawyer who "engages in the practice of law in Vermont," seems somewhat forced as a matter of
language, if desirable as a matter of policy.
155. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
For further discussion, see supra notes 32, 47 and accompanying text; infra note 197 and
accompanying text.
at
State
Bar
of
California,
State
Bar
Overview,
156. See
http:lwwvv.calbar.org/2bar/inbrief.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2002).
157. See CAL. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-100(D) (1994).
158. Id. R. 1-100(D)(1).
159. Id. R. 1-100(D)(2). The rule goes on to state: "but nothing contained in these rules shall be
deemed to authorize the performance of such functions by such [nonadmitted] persons in this state
except as otherwise permitted by law." Id.
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Several additional states have similar regulations,' 60 and at least
Indiana 61 and West Virginia 62 have claimed the power to pursue
discipline against out-of-state lawyers through judicial decision.
That more states have not adopted comparable, and wider, scope to
their disciplinary codes is not for lack of explicit bar association support.
The ABA has itself formally adopted as policy the position that the hook
of local admission should be abandoned in favor of a broader rule.
Although not stated in the text of the ABA Model Rules itself, the ABA
Model Rules-for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement state in Rule 6(A)
that the jurisdiction of the state's supreme court and its disciplinary
agency extends both to locally-admitted lawyers "and any lawyer not
admitted in this state who practices law or renders or offers to render any
legal services in this state."'' 3 That position would be brought into the
Model Rules as well if the ABA House of Delegates accepts the

160. See Daly, supra note 96, at 749 n.146. In her 1995 article, Professor Daly lists the six
following states and quotes relevant language from their rules, which I have brought current:
Alaska: ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1999) ("A person who, although not
admitted to practice law in Alaska, is permitted to practice law pursuant to court rule or order
[there] is subject to the disciplinary authority [of Alaska] to the same extent as if the person were
admitted to practice in Alaska."); Arkansas: ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1997) (rule
applies to admitted lawyer or a lawyer "practicing in this jurisdiction"); California: CAL. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDucr R. 1-100(D) (1994); Maryland: MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)
(2000)-in Maryland, in addition to locally-admitted lawyers, the rules also apply to:
(b) A lawyer not admitted by the Court of Appeals to practice in this State is subject to
the disciplinary authority of this State for conduct that constitutes a violation of these
Rules and that:
(1) involves the practice of law in this State by that lawyer, or
(2) involves the lawyer holding himself or herself out as practicing law in this
State, or
(3) involves the practice of law in this State by another lawyer over whom that
lawyer has the obligation of supervision or control.
Id.; Michigan: MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2001) ("A lawyer who is licensed to
practice in another jurisdiction and who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction."); North Dakota: N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 8.5(b) (2000) (stating that lawyers admitted elsewhere "who actually engage in this jurisdiction
in the practice of law" are subject to state's disciplinary jurisdiction).
To Professor Daly's list should be added at least the following: Idaho: IDAHO RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2000) ("A lawyer admitted to practice in other jurisdictions is subject to
the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted in this state, and may be subject [sic] of appropriate
enforcement proceedings in this state, with respect to any practice of law conducted in this state.");
New Hampshire: N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (1999) ("A lawyer admitted to practice
in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the
lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this
jurisdiction and another jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct.").
161. See supranote 49.
162. See supranotes 44,49 and accompanying text.
163. MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 6(A).
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recommendation of its Ethics 2000 Commission. It recommends
amending Model Rule 8.5(a) to expand the disciplinary authority of a
state adopting the amendment by adding the following language: "A

lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer renders or offers to render any
legal services in this jurisdiction....",4
The procedural means by which a state can acquire personal

jurisdiction over an out-of-state lawyer for the purposes of professional
discipline are ready to hand. In fact, in some instances of discipline of
in-state lawyers, in-hand service of process is not possible because of the
lawyer's flight or other departure from the state. Most states provide,
either as an alternative to in-hand service of process or as a method that

may be employed in the first instance, that service by mail suffices."
The usual games that might be played with service are made unavailing,
for example by a rule that service by certified mall is effective even if
the lawyer-recipient attempts to defeat it by refusing to accept and sign
the certification.' 66 Many states have followed the recommendation of

164. REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION, supra note 6, at 274 (proposed Model Rule 8.5(a)).
The unofficial reporter's explanation of changes notes that the amendment "is an appropriate rule to
adopt in the [ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct], given that a jurisdiction in which a
lawyer is not admitted may be the one most interested in disciplining the lawyer for improper
conduct." let at 277 (R. 8.5 & Reporter's Explanation of Changes):
There are a number of ways in which discipline might be implemented, including
making a disciplinary record and sending it to states in which the lawyer is admitted and
having those jurisdictions impose reciprocal discipline. (Alternatively, if disciplinary
authorities are ever given a broader range of sanctions, e.g., fines, fee forfeiture or an
award of damages, the disciplining jurisdiction could act on the lawyer directly.)
Id.
165. See, e.g., In re Smith, 794 P.2d 601, 603 (Ariz. 1990) (in banc) (approving use of
substituted service under civil rules on lawyer incarcerated in out-of-state federal prison).
166. See, e.g., Baca v. State Bar, 801 P.2d 412, 416 (Cal. 1990) (in bank). In Baca, the
California Supreme Court held that service of notice of disciplinary charges by certified mail was
effective despite a lawyer's failure, through three written notices from the postal service, to retrieve
certified mail awaiting his signature. See iL The court stated that "Baca cannot defeat service by
refusing to accept his mall, and he cannot now come before this court and argue that his own
dereliction caused the notice to be defective." Id. The ultimate game-ignoring service of processis, of course, as unavailing for lawyer defendants in bar discipline proceedings as it is for defendants
generally. Default will occur. See, e.g., In re Chew, 448 S.E.2d 443, 444 (Ga. 1994) (per curiam)
(holding that lawyer who, on receipt of disciplinary complaint in envelope, simply placed unopened
envelope in desk defaulted and was therefore ordered disbarred on pleaded charges); Harrison v.
Miss. Bar, 637 So. 2d 204, 215 (Miss. 1994) (en bane) (holding that incorporation of civil rules into
bar disciplinary proceedings results in default on the part of lawyer who took no action after being
effectively served with disciplinary complaint). Moreover, willful disregard of a served complaint
of disciplinary charges has been treated as an aggravating factor in imposing discipline. See, e.g.,
Middleton v. State Bar, 796 P.2d 1326, 1334 (Cal. 1990) (in bank) (holding that lawyer's willful
failure to keep bar informed of current address, as required, does not invalidate service of
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the ABA's Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement and
provided for service by registered or certified mail as an alternative to
in-hand service. 67 Moreover, many states have also followed the
1
recommendation to incorporate the state's civil rules by reference, 6
providing an independent basis for invoking the state's long-arm statute
when needed. The only barrier to sensible enforcement against out-ofstate lawyers is continued insistence on the supremacy of the local
admission rule. The foregoing establishes that it is unnecessary. As will
next be discussed, the rule is also a bad idea.
VI.

REASONS WHY THE LOCAL ADMISSION RULE IS

BAD STATE POLICY
The admission-only basis for bar discipline leaves states open to
activity by out-of-state lawyers that should be, but is not, subject to local
disciplinary regulation. The potential undesirable effects of such uneven
regulation are several. First, other potentially available remedies do not
adequately and in all important instances vindicate the state's interest in
regulating lawyer activity that has undesirable in-state effects-on
clients, third parties, and the system of justice. Second, out-of-state
lawyers are treated with, in effect, greater solicitude that in some
circumstances can place them at an unfair competitive advantage with
respect to regulated in-state lawyers. Third, there are distinctive
procedural advantages that could be gained from local regulation of outof-state lawyers. Fourth, because of the continuance of the local
admission mindset, states may continue to be misled into otherwise
extravagant notions, such as the belief expressed in some opinions that
the absence of regulatory power over nonadmitted lawyers justified a
stringent test of unauthorized practice as applied to such lawyers in order
to preclude them from practicing within the state. Such a statement is
extravagant because, as analyzed in this Article, states do have the
power to regulate out-of-state lawyering with a local impact.'6 The
failure of a state to implement that power is entirely a self-inflicted

disciplinary papers and, together with other circumstances, constitutes basis for enhanced sanctions
for lack of cooperation with proceeding).
167. See MODEL DISCIPLINARY RuLEs, supra note 7, R. 13(A) (providing for personal service
of statement of charges or by registered or certified mail to address shown on agency's current
registry).
168. See id. R. 18(B) (generally incorporating a state's civil procedure rules except where
inconsistent with explicit rule).
169. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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limitation. As such, it hardly supports an argument for Draconian
restrictions on transitory lawyers based on necessity.
A.

The Inadequacy of NondisciplinaryRemedies

Demonstrating that the local admission rule might lead to
undesirable effects does not, by itself suffice, for it could be urged that,
aside from the process of bar discipline, out-of-state lawyers remain
subject to a significant range of other procedural remedies, and that, in
view of the (imagined) plentitude of such remedies, the case for state
disciplinary jurisdiction over nonadmitted lawyers cannot be made.
While portions of such an argument are unassailable (for example, that
other remedies at least theoretically exist), its implicit claim that other
available, nondisciplinary remedies suffice to vindicate all important
state policies is, in my view, incorrect.
To be sure, for many wrongs described in a state's lawyer code or
otherwise sought to be proscribed, remedies other than lawyer discipline
are available. For example, and as discussed in more detail above,"' in
the factual scenario assumed to exist in the Allen decision, in-person
solicitation within a state constitutes a misdemeanor offense punishable
by criminal prosecution.7 1 Legally cognizable injury that the
nonadmitted lawyer might inflict on a person within the state, such as
financial harm caused by false statements made by the lawyer in the
course of the solicitation, could be remedied through a civil action by
that person, and courts of the state would be available because of the
effective reach of the state's long-arm statute.'72 Moreover, if one's
concern is with threatened future repetitions of the wrongful activity,
states are clearly empowered to entertain a suit against the out-of-state
lawyer to enjoin such,' again, basing personal jurisdiction over the outof-state lawyers on the state's long-arm statute.

170. See supranotes 15-31 and accompanying text.
171. See supranote 16 and accompanying text.
172. See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
173. For example, the Supreme Court of Florida in December 1999 considered a proposal of
the state's bar to extend the state's advertising and solicitation rules to all lawyers (and not just
Florida lawyers) who advertise or solicit in the state. See In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the
Fla. Bar-Adver. Rules, 762 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam). The proposal was stimulated
by an asserted influx of out-of-state lawyers to solicit the families of victims of a Florida Everglades
air crash. See id. The Florida court rejected the proposal, apparently on the belief that existing
remedies sufficed: "Our case law is clear that improper solicitation or advertising in Florida by
lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions is prohibited as the unlicensed practice of law[,]" and thus
would presumably be subject to injunction in Florida, and "such lawyers remain subject to the
disciplinary authority of the jurisdictions in which they have been admitted." l- at 394-95.
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But, even if such remedies are theoretically available, there remain
significant reasons for concern that they might not serve all legitimate
and important state interests. Again, take the instance of in-state
solicitation. The presumed availability of response through a criminal
prosecution is probably ill-founded, for the reasons already discussed.' 74
Prosecutors simply have larger fish to fry and insufficient resources to
squander them in misdemeanor prosecutions against out-of-state
defendants-particularly predictably litigious lawyer-defendants. An
action for an injunction against future violations, 17 while supportable on
a broad base of personal jurisdiction, must be brought by a self-selected
plaintiff (if, for example, brought by an individual lawyer admitted in
the state or a bar association of such lawyers) or by a state prosecutor.
No such individual is any longer entrusted with the formulation and
application of the state's policy on matters of lawyer discipline, and
there is insufficient reason to believe that all such prosecutions (with
their ample opportunities for plea bargaining and settlement
arrangements) will closely and carefully follow the state's bar policy
regarding the charged offense. 176 Such an action could, of course, be
brought by bar disciplinary authorities, but then would be filed in an
unfamiliar tribunal.
Further, while the possibility exists that the lawyer's unlawful
activities in West Virginia may be the subject of bar disciplinary
proceedings in any other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to
practice, there is ample room for doubt that such a theoretical possibility
will come to pass in many instances. In the situation described in the
Allen decision, it would be open for the District of Columbia bar
authorities to initiate a home state disciplinary proceeding, as discussed
above. 77 In fact, however, bar disciplinary authorities in almost all states
174. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
176. Different, of course, would be the imposition of contempt sanctions as a remedy in the
specific context of a professional disciplinary proceeding itself. While rare, such sanctions are
occasionally encountered and seem consistent with the customary notion that the disciplinary
proceeding is held pursuant to otherwise-applicable rules of civil procedure. See, e.g., In re Cook,
526 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ind. 1988) (per curiam) (holding that hearing officer had power to hold
respondent lawyer in contempt, with $300 fine as sanction, for flagrant tardiness in attending a
scheduled hearing).
177. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. For a recent, arguable instance of a
counterexample, see In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026 (D.C. 2001), where a lawyer, admitted in both
D.C. and Virginia, was disciplined in D.C. for moving to withdraw in a Virginia proceeding and
revealing clients' secrets in violation of the Virginia lawyer code. See id. at 1032. In such instances,
it well might be that the bar disciplinary officials of the two potentially interested jurisdictions
confer and decide which of the two should proceed, with the other jurisdiction being available for
the imposition of reciprocal discipline, if any.
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operate with limited personnel, a limited budget, and resistance from bar
leaders, lawyer volunteers who in most jurisdictions continue to provide
much of the staffing, and lawyers and other professionals who must
serve on hearing boards. As a result, bar disciplinary professionals
operate on somewhat of a triage basis: using their limited enforcement
resources primarily (if not exclusively) to remedy lawyer conduct with
serious, or at least notorious, local effects. While a District of Columbia
disciplinary counsel whose attention was drawn to the facts might
conclude that the facts of the Allen decision might warrant discipline in
an ideal system, in a world of limited resources, she well might conclude
that funds and personnel are better employed for antisocial activities of
lawyers who are either accused of local wrongdoing or where proof of
wrongdoing elsewhere has already been substantially established-either
through a criminal conviction, which can be locally proved quite
efficiently through the judgment of the nonlocal court, or through
professional discipline elsewhere, which can again be proved efficiently
through the cooperative process of interstate reciprocal discipline.r
Indeed, it has been argued that this reluctance to prosecute is so
generalized that bar disciplinary agencies would refuse to implement
expanded powers to discipline out-of-state lawyers for in-state
conduct.'79 The concern about underutilized disciplinary power is,
however, surely overstated. What is true is that agencies must, and do,
make reasonable decisions about offenses to prosecute and those not to
pursue, with the hope that offenses left unprosecuted will nonetheless be
subject to other consequences. And it follows that disciplinary agencies
will reasonably decide not to devote resources to some, perhaps many,
instances of wrongdoing committed in the jurisdiction by out-of-state
lawyers. But it hardly follows that no prosecution will ever prove of
local interest. As I will argue later, bar discipline should be reserved for
just such misconduct, but it certainly should be possible to assert
disciplinary power in those very cases.

178. See supranotes 80-87 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Ethics 2000 Panel's Proposals Won't Reach Floor Debate Anytime Soon,
Member Predicts,16 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 278, 278 (June 7, 2000) (reporting
comment by bar disciplinary official at open hearing by ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission
questioning whether "as a practical matter will disciplinary counsel be willing to commit the
resources necessary to pursue nonadmitted lawyers and to achieve enforcement of their state's
discipline order in the lawyer's home state?").
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B. The Salience of Local DisciplinaryPolicy
Another, and more fundamental reason why the local admission
rule is bad policy is broadly suggested by asking the radical question:
why not abolish professional discipline entirely-for all lawyers-and
rely instead upon other remedies to enforce the objectives of the lawyer
codes?'80 Answering that question is certainly germane to the present
inquiry, for a state that fails to regulate nonadmitted lawyers through the
process of professional discipline, in effect, proceeds on the implicit
assumption that nondisciplinary remedies suffice or that in-state acts by
nonadmitted lawyers are categorically not a matter of sufficient
importance to warrant regulation. Critics of the system of bar discipline
abound, but none has been so radical as to suggest eliminating the
system entirely. Were the radical question raised of the base justification
for the separate system of lawyer discipline, certainly the organized bar
would oppose it. For the organized bar and the courts, professional
discipline provides unique and important social and institutional benefits
that cannot be duplicated by other possible sanctions-benefits so
important as to require maintenance of the system of lawyer discipline.
The importance of bar discipline can be explained in both
substantive and procedural terms. Substantively, the lawyer codes
embody a set of policies that are unique to lawyers and that are
sometimes unique to the jurisdiction. Those codes attempt to balance
assumptions and understandings about how the work of the profession
should be carried on, and the codes do so against the background of both
existing state law and such fundamental professional policies as the right
to the effective assistance of counsel and the centrality of client loyalty.
The resulting matrix of regulation reflects what is unique to each state in
the necessary process of balancing lawyer claims for such matters as the
preeminence of client objectives against broader social interests, such as
protecting innocent persons (including both clients and others) from
harm. Lawyers also work constantly with public institutions, and their
misconduct in the course of that work can impose dramatic and
deleterious impacts upon them. To take only the most obvious example,
courts are vulnerable institutions if unprotected by bar discipline (among
other remedial systems) against fraudulent or overly-aggressive lawyers.
The same is true, of course, of other public institutions such as
administrative tribunals and agencies.
180. In more radical form, the question can be directed to the lawyer codes themselves, asking
why they should not be repealed and antisocial lawyer behavior left to regulation by the law of torts
and contracts, along with the criminal law.
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Nor should it be supposed, as overconcentration on national
"models" for lawyer codes tend to do, that the lawyer codes in fact
applied in each of the states reflect national uniformity of approach. The
contrary has been illustrated in every significant attempt in recent
decades to formulate national standards for the legal profession and in
the process of attempting to achieve state-by-state adoption and revision
of lawyer codes. The substantive standards for lawyer conduct have
intensely local dimensions. Each state has sometimes insisted on
significant variations in their local lawyer codes as compared with
national "models."'' All of that strongly implies the importance of local
bar disciplinary policy.
Closely tied to the substantive objectives sought to be achieved by
the individualized state lawyer codes is the process of lawyer discipline.
That system, now adjudicated in part before members of the public
(through nonlawyer membership on bar disciplinary bodies in most
jurisdictions) but also with strong representation from among other
lawyers, seeks to bring to questions of proper lawyer conduct a
combination of local community values together with the knowledge,
traditions, and aspirations of law practice. Appellate review by lawyerjudges of at least all serious allegations of lawyer misconduct also
suggests the importance of the jurisdiction's lawyer disciplinary system
for vindicating important legal professional objectives.
All of those uniquely local values of lawyer regulation are set at
naught due to the local admission requirement, which denies to the state
all effective regulatory power over nonlocal lawyers. I next consider
another not-inconsequential, but hardly as devastating, consequence of
that imbalance-the imbalance in treatment in imposing discipline
between local and nonadmitted lawyers.

181. The reality of disuniformity was driven home to my Cornell colleague Roger C. Cramton
and me some years ago when searching for a way to avoid paying the ABA the high royalty cost of
placing a copy of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct on Cornell's free access Legal
Information Institute website (on what is now known as L1's American Legal Ethics Library,
http://www.law.come.edu (last visited Apr. 22, 2002) which now contains links to the codes of
every American jurisdiction). We spent many hours searching for the jurisdiction whose adoption of
the ABA's model was, hopefully for the purpose, slavishly close. To the general credit of the states
involved, we found that only one state came close. That close copy was the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct. (Idaho's bar was quite willing to grant copyright permission gratis for the
purpose.) Even there, the state had significantly departed from the ABA model in its
advertising rules.
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C. Equal DisciplinaryTreatment of Local and Nonlocal Practitioners
Although the point should not be overstated, the potential exists
under the local admission rule for serious differences in the extent to
which locally admitted lawyers are subject to the regulatory policies of
each state as compared to nonadmitted lawyers. While the present state
of lawyer multijurisdictional practice has not yet brought to light any
instance in which an out-of-state lawyer has advertised her greater
freedom from local regulation in order to be better able to attract local
clients, situations such as that presented in the Allen decision do strongly
suggest that out-of-state lawyers who are not subject to local regulation
may attempt to take advantage of their relatively greater immunity from
effective local regulation to take risks with the limits of those regulations
that a local practitioner, if known to be more likely vulnerable to local
regulation, would not take. The resulting state of affairs breeds
opportunities for out-of-state lawyers to push the regulatory envelope
and beyond, with consequent enhancement of the risk that locally
required protections for clients, third parties, and public institutions will
suffer in the process. Moreover, the threat of such immunized
competitors may occur to in-state lawyers as cause for competition-inkind. On the facts of the Allen decision, local lawyers may be motivated
to solicit unlawfully so as not to lose potential local clients to out-ofstate lawyers who might, due to the local admission rule, feel more
willing to do so. Nonenforcement against out-of-state lawyers would
induce some tendency at least for a race to the bottom in solicitation
practices.
D. The Question of Efficacy of Disciplinein a Nonadmission State
A possible objection to any thesis that discipline should be
expanded into states in which a lawyer is not admitted is that doing so
would be otiose. The objection would be based on the observation thatas a matter of definition-a nonadmitted lawyer cannot be subjected to
disbarment or suspension. Such an objection, which is sometimes heard
in discussions of this topic, takes too narrow a view of the range of
available disciplinary remedies and their collateral consequences under
the concept of reciprocal discipline. Under that concept, a finding in a
disciplinary proceeding in State A that a lawyer violated a lawyer code
provision will be given presumptive recognition in every other state in

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss3/17

44

Wolfram: Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-of-State Lawyers
20021

EXPANDING STATE JURISDICTION

which the lawyer is admitted.8 2 It is true that the most familiar bar

disciplinary remedies by far are disbarment and suspension. It is also
true that those familiar remedies are either meaningless or should
properly be considered beyond the power of State A with respect to a
lawyer who has been admitted to practice only in State B. They are
meaningless within State A, because the lawyer implicitly claims no
local license, but in effect takes a defiant stance with respect to the legal
requirements of State A. Disbarment and suspension are beyond the
power of State A, since it would be unconstitutional for a court in State A
182. The typically limited effect given to a sister-state finding of a lawyer code violation is
significantly different from the interstate operation of collateral estoppel. Under the latter doctrine,
findings that are the product of actual litigation and that are necessary to a judgment cannot be
relitigated. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (setting out general
rule of collateral estoppel (called issue preclusion in the Restatement)). Moreover, judgments of
State A will be given collateral estoppel effect in State B. The contemporary interstate effect of
disciplinary findings under the doctrine of reciprocal discipline is quite different. The rules on
reciprocal discipline give only presumptive, or prima facie finality to disciplinary findings of sisterstates. See WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs, supra note 18, § 3.4.6, at 116. An older view, that
states were required to accept sister-state disciplinary findings without question under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, see id. at 116 n.84, seems no longer to be followed.
Unlike the operation of collateral estoppel, the very dominant position in reciprocal
discipline cases is to accept a finding of the other state as presumptively correct unless the lawyer
can demonstrate some serious defect giving a substantial basis for refusing to accept the finding. See
id. (describing states' general acceptance of findings of other states, unless shown to be seriously
defective); see also People v. Mattox, 862 P.2d 276, 277 n.2 (Colo. 1993) (per curiam) (quoting
state bar rule providing for accepting findings of other states unless proceedings were lacking in due
process or lawyer establishes basis for "clear conviction" that finding suffered from infirmity of
proof); In re Lichtenberg, 871 P.2d 981, 982 (N.M. 1994) (per curiam) (same); In re Erickson, 510
N.W.2d 127, 127-28 (Vis. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that decision of Missouri Supreme Court in
subsequent and unrelated case that rule of evidence applied against lawyer in earlier disciplinary
proceeding was erroneous and created an "infirmity of proof' in disbarment proceedings, precluding
giving preclusive effect to its findings). That procedure follows the recommendations of the ABA in
its MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 22(D), which provides a model reciprocal
discipline standard for accepting fact findings. It is also consistent with the approach taken by the
United States Supreme Court in determining whether a federal court should accept a finding of a
state court that a lawyer has committed disciplinary misconduct. See Theard v. United States, 354
U.S. 278, 281 (1957). But cf. In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir. 1995) (dubiously reading
Theard to support dicta that state disciplinary authorities could not relitigate finding of federal court
that lawyer had committed contempt). The opportunity for a lawyer to demonstrate such infirmity
has been held required by due process. See State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Dineen, 455
N.W.2d 178, 180 (Neb. 1990).
Not all decisions apparently follow the ABA's recommended approach. Some states
appear to apply rules more akin to settled collateral estoppel doctrine. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v.
Friedman, 646 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that, in view of state bar rule that
other-jurisdiction finding is considered "conclusive proof' of misconduct, lawyer could not contest
New York finding even though it was based on a lesser proof standard (preponderance of evidence)
than Florida requires (clear and convincing evidence)); Miss. Bar v. Strauss, 601 So. 2d 840, 844
(Miss. 1992) (en bane) (stating that Mississippi would follow similar approach, the only open issue
is the type of sanction).
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to purport to affect so directly a solemn decision of the supreme court of
State B to admit the lawyer in question to practice.' But, total fixation
on the remedies of disbarment and suspension would be too limited, for
two reasons.
First, one must not lose sight of the much more extensive arsenal of
remedies available to contemporary bar disciplinary agencies quite
beyond stripping away the privilege of local admission through
disbarment and suspension. While some states have not empowered their
bar disciplinary agencies to impose all such sanctions, in several states,
court decisions or regulations authorize such other disciplinary
penalties' as fines,' reprimands, '1 6 probation,'8 or injunction orders. 8 s
Any objection that those other remedies are readily evaded by a
nonadmitted lawyer, of course, ignores the federal constitutional
requirement that, to the extent the latter proceeding does not involve
183. I am aware of no such attempt, but should one be attempted, it is not at all clear that such
would be consistent with a notion of comity between the states that might be found by the United
States Supreme Court to have constitutional dimensions.
184. On the general range of nonsuspension disciplinary remedies, see generally WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 18, § 3.5.6, at 135-38, which discusses restitutionary orders in
bar discipline proceedings, and id. § 3.5.7, at 139-41, considering other sanctions, such as
conservatorship, probation, supervised practice, retraining, costs, sanctions, and fines.
185. See, e.g., In re Stuhff, 837 P.2d 853, 857-58 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that
lawyer who personally served a disciplinary complaint on a judge trying a criminal case of a client
should be fined $5000 and reprimanded, rather than suspended for six months as recommended by
disciplinary board); cf In re Huckaby, 694 So. 2d 906, 907 (La. 1997) (per curiam) (ordering
lawyer, as condition to probation, to pay all past-due taxes, interest and fines assessed by taxing
authorities). The ABA Model Disciplinary Rules do not list fines as an available sanction. See
MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 10(A) (listing only disbarment, suspension,
probation, reprimand, administrative admonition, restitution, and costs as available sanctions). Some
courts refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of fines as a disciplinary sanction. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v.
Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 89 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (holding that disciplinary board has no
authority to impose sanction of fines).
186. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Patterson, 28 P.3d 551, 560 (Okla. 2001) (per
curiam) (ordering "public censure" as reciprocal-discipline sanction for offenses of misconduct in
federal court litigation and failing to report federal court sanctions to state disciplinary office). See
generally MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 10(A)(4) (imposing a written reprimand
by court or disciplinary board, in either event to be published).
187. See, e.g., In re Smith, 625 So. 2d 476, 477 (La. 1993) (per curiam) (imposing one-year
suspension followed by one-year probation during which lawyer was required to hire a certified
public accountant to conduct quarterly audits of trust account); Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Morton,
410 S.E.2d 279, 282 (W. Va. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that failure to communicate properly with
clients required period of probation with supervision through mentoring program). See generally
MODEL DISCIPLINARY RULES, supra note 7, R. 10(A)(3) (describing the sanction of probation).
188. An injunction issued by the Indiana Supreme Court against an out-of-state lawyer
enjoined the lawyer from any future violation of Indiana's lawyer code. See supra note 49. In each
instance, the offense hardly extended to the entire lawyer code. In effect, the court was adopting an
extremely broad-based kind of injunctive relief sometimes found in orders of administrative
agencies in enforcement actions.
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lawyer discipline, all other states give full faith and credit to the judicial
decrees of every other state.' 9 In the instance of possible lawyerdisciplinary proceedings in other states, it ignores the now well
established operation of the notion of reciprocal discipline.'9 Thus, at the
level of the power of a nonadmitting state to impose professional
discipline, some entirely meaningful sanctions are readily available, so
long as they have been provided for by local rule or decision.
Second, even an apparently mild remedy such as a reprimand can
have quite serious collateral consequences-including consequences in a
local admission state. Moreover, those consequences can be much more
severe than the sanction that can be imposed in the jurisdiction first
adjudicating the offense. Take, for example, the situation confronting the
West Virginia Supreme Court in the Allen'9' decision-out-of-state
lawyers soliciting West Virginia clients. While a reprimand administered
to such a lawyer will be, presumably, a significantly less arduous-and
thus, in some sense, an arguably overly lenient-remedy than might be
imposed on a soliciting lawyer admitted locally, the story would most
likely not end there. To follow the specific facts of that decision, back
home in the District of Columbia, a lawyer so disciplined would find
that bar regulators in the District operate under an active system of
reciprocal discipline.' 2 Under that notion, the District's own bar
disciplinary body will give presumptive effect to the findings of fact of
West Virginia. 93 Among other considerations, that effect makes the
prosecution more attractive to a busy District bar counsel, because it
avoids the expense and inconvenience of proving an offense that
occurred at a distance. In the District, moreover, local remedies will
include those of disbarment and suspension which are not available in
the jurisdiction in which the lawyer was not admitted.' 94 Such a more
drastic sanction might be warranted, for example, because of the
9
lawyer's prior disciplinary offenses9'
or because of the aggravated
nature of the offense.'

189. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Again, one must note that the rules of reciprocal discipline
are more relaxed than the rules of collateral estoppel. See generally supra note 182.
190. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
191. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Allen, 479 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1996). For further discussion
of Allen, see supranotes 16-24 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
193. See supranote 182.
194. See Allen, 479 S.E.2d at 336.
195. On prior disciplinary offenses as an aggravating factor, see ABA STANDARDS FOR
SANCTIONS, supra note 64, R. 9.22(a), which lists "prior disciplinary offenses" as one of several
factors that may justify an increase in the severity of sanctions otherwise appropriate. Note that the
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In summary, to my mind the case for local disciplinary regulation
of certain activities of nonadmitted, out-of-state lawyers is compelling.
But that does not lead to a reversal of doctrine as radical as, for example,
the logically possible proposition that each state should be empowered
to impose professional discipline on all lawyers, wherever admitted to
practice and no matter how ephemeral their contact with the state and
how inconsequential the effects of that contact. One may well object that
this discussion is needless, as no state has proposed to regulate all outof-state lawyers. I wish that could confidently be agreed to, but there are
intimations in decisions such as Birbrower of a truly extravagant
substantive reach of a state's power to apply its concepts of correct
lawyering to nonadmitted lawyers. I refer to the portion of the California
Supreme Court's opinion in which, admittedly with indirection and
ambiguity, the majority makes the alarming suggestion that a New York
lawyer sitting at her desk in New York and advising a New York
resident (who was an officer of a California-incorporated entity) about a
point of California law would be subject to the unauthorized practice
(and perhaps other) laws of California. 97 With no connections to
California other than those, it is unclear whether the United States
Supreme Court (were it to hear the case) would uphold a decision of
California to apply its own law to the New York-based activities of the
ABA Standards refer to offenses without regard to whether the offense had previously been found in
a disciplinary proceeding.
196. The ABA Standards for Sanctions list in rule 9 a number of aggravating factors based on
the nature of the offense: dishonest or selfish motive; a pattern of misconduct; multiple offenses;
and vulnerability of the victim. See id. R. 9.22.
A bar rule in the District of Columbia provides that in a reciprocal discipline proceeding,
the court will apply a rebuttable presumption that discipline will be the same as was imposed in the
originating jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Fuller, 674 A.2d 907, 909 (D.C. 1996) (per curiam) (holding
that, while D.C. would ordinarily impose longer period of suspension for same offense, court would
follow Illinois period of suspension where within range of what D.C. might impose in same types of
cases, without regard to specific aggravating factors here). That rule seems to rest on a background
assumption that the other jurisdiction would have had an opportunity to apply any one of the
customary range of disciplinary sanctions. Such a rule would, of course, be inappropriate in the
special instance of discipline imposed by a nonadmission jurisdiction.
197. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d I
(Cal. 1998), stating that, in determining whether a lawyer practiced "in California":
The primary inquiry is whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient activities in
the state, or created a continuing relationship with the California client that included
legal duties and obligations.
Our definition does not necessarily depend on or require the unlicenced lawyer's
physical presence in the state. Physical presence here is one factor ... but it is by no
means exclusive. For example, one may practice law in the state ... by advising a
California client on California law in connection with a California legal dispute by
telephone, fax, computer, or other modern technological means.
Id. at 5-6.
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New York lawyer. In a sensible world, no such issue would ever be
presented. Beyond the possible compulsion of federal constitutional law,
as a matter of sound local policy, local resources devoted to lawyer
discipline should be deployed only when there is a reasonable likelihood
of achieving a significant and justifiable objective of local policy. That
would seem to require further articulation of state interests other than
some arguable but entirely tenuous connection to the state.
At an extreme opposite end of state policy concern, several of the
few articulated state rules in jurisdictions that do permit local
disciplinary agencies to deal with state lawyers contain arguable
limitations that seem both unintended and unwise. Those too require
address. I turn to both sets of issues in the Article's final portion, which
attempts to formulate a standard that empowers the state's disciplinary
authorities to subject to local disciplinary scrutiny all instances, but only
such instances in which such an exercise of extraterritorial power
seems wise.
VII.

SENSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION

A.

FederalConstitutionalLimitations on Extraterritorial
Regulation of Lawyers

An inherent and natural consequence of the American federal
system of government is that the extraterritorial power of each state must
be subject to significant constraint. 9 Failure to recognize some such
limiting rule would produce the chaotic, burdensome and unfair
spectacle of states attempting to export to other states their own
conception of appropriate policy or other outcome, imposing that policy
or outcome on persons and institutions that had no connection with the
proclaiming state. Such unlimited rulemaking would quite predictably
produce conflicts of policies and norms.'9 Such a regime would be
unfair in several respects. Citizens in distant states with an appropriately
law-abiding bent of mind could hardly hope to cope with the confusing
array of local and nonlocal state laws, all contending for application on a
national (if not international2° ) basis. The out-of-state reach of a state's
198. See Kreimer, supranote 9, at 519.
199. Theoretically, one could attempt to resolve the resulting bedlam by imposing a
constitutionally mandated choice-of-law system for resolving such conflicts. The solution under the
Due Process and Commerce Clauses has been, if less elegant, more straightforward.
200. On the special problem of state laws that may interfere with the exclusive control of the
federal government over foreign policy, see, for example, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968),
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law would hardly comport with democratic theory, under which there is
at least rough reciprocity between the power of a state to regulate and
the power and right of citizens of the state to affect the shape of
regulation (and the political careers of elected regulators) through
exercise of the power of the ballot box.20' Moreover, the specter of
citizens of one state being hailed into the distant courts of another state
without any legitimizing basis for imposition of such a burden would be
fundamentally unfair.
Those and similar considerations have been worked out as a matter
of federal constitutional law in two bodies of limitations on the territorial
reach of the governmental powers of states. One body of law concerns
the substantive power of a state to regulate persons and activities outside
the state. Chief among these are Supreme Court cases dealing with the
power of a state to impose taxes on nonresidents of the state. 2 Another
body of law, already touched upon in the case of lawyer respondents,
concerns due process limitations on the exercise by state courts of
jurisdiction.203 For present purposes, the command of each can be
captured by concepts from personal jurisdiction requiring that (1) the
respondent lawyer must have purposefully availed herself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the state asserting regulatory
jurisdiction, and (2) that, considering all the circumstances, the burden
of defending the disciplinary proceeding would not be unfair. Where,
precisely, those lines should be drawn is, for reasons next to be explored,
not a matter that should concern a state in establishing policy about such
jurisdiction. For, as next discussed, the line of policy should be drawn
well short of the outermost limits to which the Federal Constitution
would permit a state to reach.
where the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute on the ground that it limited situations in
which a nonresident alien could take property from an in-state decedent. See id. at 440-41. Also
prohibited are state laws that discriminate against aliens as an insular minority. See, e.g., Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (holding unconstitutional as impermissibly discriminatory
under Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause state law limiting in-state land ownership on
grounds of race or national origin of person providing funds for purchase).
201. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1062-1153 (2d
ed. 1988).
202. Compare Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 315 (1998) (holding
unconstitutional on privileges and immunities grounds a New York statute that effectively denied
only nonresident taxpayers income tax deduction for alimony payments), with Scripto, Inc. v.
Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1960) (holding that Florida's requirement that out-of-state
manufacturer collect and pay use tax on sale solicited in state by independent parties did not offend
either the Interstate Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
203. See, e.g., CLERMONT, supra note 36, at 21-24 (noting that "from outside the states, the
Constitution and its Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit how far they can
reach").
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B. PrudentialLimitations on Lawyer-DisciplinaryJurisdiction
As already discussed, there are weighty practical reasons why a
state that wishes its bar disciplinary machinery to energize itself to deal
with an in-state offense by an out-of-state lawyer should recognize that
the machinery is inherently and necessarily in short supply and should
not be employed in envelope-pushing attempts to obtain jurisdiction
over out-of-state lawyers.7 O A separate consideration points very
strongly in the same direction of restraint, and it would even apply in a
world of unlimited disciplinary resources. As has been uniformly
recognized, even in otherwise-restrictive decisions, it is often highly
useful, if not indispensable for a lawyer admitted only in State A to be
able to be physically present in State B on a transitory basis in order to
provide effective legal services to the lawyer's clients who have affairs
that are interstate in character. It is certainly often necessary for such a
lawyer, while physically present in State A, to have tangential
relationships with State B, such as by researching and advising clients
about the law of State B. °s It would impose an undue and unwarranted
burden on such useful and benign legal services for a distant state to
assert the power to bring into its bar disciplinary system a lawyer
admitted in and primarily practicing in another state, whose activities
have not had a significant and direct contact with the state considering
disciplinary action.
For those reasons, it would be entirely unnecessary and unwise to
empower a state's bar counsel to bring before the local disciplinary
hearing body each instance in which it would be constitutional to do so,
although that is typically the only limitation on the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction in private-party civil litigation. Jurisdiction should be limited
to situations of strong and important state regulatory interest. That can
be accomplished by limiting the grant of jurisdiction by signaling to bar
counsel, the disciplinary hearing body, and the reviewing supreme court
the concept that the grant of jurisdiction is to be used only when there is
a significant local impact caused by the lawyer's alleged acts and when
that impact involves important local interests. Those generalities can
perhaps best be captured through illustrative cases.

204. See supra text accompanying note 179.
205. Some lawyers with whom I've discussed the issue balk at this as a generality, although
their hesitation often seems based on the notion that the advice is flat-footedly unconditional. But no
one to whom I have spoken has balked at the idea that lawyers everywhere should be considered
competent to research and advise their clients about Delaware corporate law. Surely, however, the
concept is more robust than that.
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Consider, first, the instance of in-state solicitation of clients, as in
the Allen decision. 2 Given the strong state interest in protecting in-state
residents against the importuning and invasion of privacy that
solicitation is thought often to entail,20 7 as well as the charge of
deliberate and extensive in-state activity, West Virginia could quite
plausibly find that the charged acts of the lawyers had a significant local
impact and that the impact involved important local interests. More
difficult by far would be a charge against an out-of-state lawyer that the
lawyer's website contained impermissible advertising, when assessed
under the professional rules of the charging state although it was
unexceptional under the rules of the state in which the lawyer
maintained an office and was admitted. Unless the charging state bar
counsel could demonstrate some significant local connection between
the website and the state, jurisdiction should not be permitted, even if
doing so would (perhaps barely) pass muster under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 208 Also clearly within the defined regulatory jurisdiction
would be a claim that a lawyer admitted pro hac vice had committed a
disciplinary offense that affected the proceeding or a local participant in
it. Even if the offense occurred during the course of a pretrial deposition
being taken in another jurisdiction, the facts might indicate the kind of
local impact and the involvement of local regulatory interests warranting
assertion of jurisdiction.
State power should certainly encompass all such important cases.
Accordingly, jurisdictions should be cautious in adopting the language
of many of the pioneering regulations that now attempt to transcend the
local admission rule. Some of them speak of an out-of-state lawyer
"practicing law" within the jurisdiction,2°9 or a similar practice-related
term. To be sure, that will cover most of the instances in which it would
be sound policy for the state to exercise disciplinary jurisdiction. On the
other hand, it may be under-inclusive if interpreted, as the words would
suggest, to exclude such practices as impermissibly soliciting clients
within the state. It takes more than a substantial stretch of language to
pull "practicing law" that far, particularly given the mandated ideals of
practice as spelled out in the jurisdiction's own rules. While most states

206. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 24.
208. Cf Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(employing for purposes of due process test of exercise of judicial jurisdiction, a sliding scale,
ranging from active involvement with in-state customers by business over the Internet to merely
passive posting of information on website, accessible throughout reach of Internet).
209. See supranotes 38, 160.
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would probably make the stretch to reach the violation,21 a more
straightforward solution would be to include an additional phrase such
as "or take other practice-related actions within the state."
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The system of lawyer discipline in most states has now been
professionalized and otherwise placed on a surer regulatory footing.
Calls for further reform are heard, of course, and many have merit. One
clear reform would be that suggested here--extending the reach of the
state's lawyer-regulatory arm only a modest distance to reach certain
serious instances of in-state activity by nonadmitted lawyers. The
admission-only rule is an anachronism whose reason for existence has
long since passed from the disciplinary scene. It, too, should be
consigned to the dustbin of legal ethics history.

210. See supranote 159.
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